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This dissertation combines theoretical modeling and empirical analysis in macroeco-
nomics, with a focus on open economies. It contains three chapters that study macroeco-
nomic dynamics in the presence of credit frictions and the scope for stabilization policies
in this context.
Chapter 1, “Macroeconomic Effects of Commodity Booms and Busts: The Role of Fi-
nancial Frictions”, studies the real effects of commodity price shocks in small open com-
modity exporters; and the role of financial frictions in the transmission of these shocks to
economic activity. I begin by estimating a panel VAR system for two groups of countries
heavily exposed to commodity goods exports, one containing only advanced small open
economies, and the other only emerging small open economies. I show that commodity
price shocks are important sources of business cycle fluctuations, and have stronger ef-
fects on real activity, credit, and country interest rate in emerging countries. Motivated
by these results, I construct a multi-sector open economy model with a banking sector
to gauge the importance of different financial frictions in the transmission of commodity
price shocks. I find that the main transmission channel is the interaction between the dif-
ferences in working capital constraints at the firm level and the effect of commodity prices
on the country interest rate. Moreover, I show that the financial accelerator and balance
sheet mismatches in the banking sector don’t have a relevant quantitative amplification
effect.
Chapter 2, “International Reserves, Credit Constraints, and Systemic Sudden Stops",
analyzes the puzzling fact that emerging markets hold very high levels of international
reserves and foreign liabilities simultaneously. Moreover, these holdings are positively
correlated, which leads to an income loss that might reach 2% of GDP per year. To address
this issue, I propose a new motive for international reserves accumulation, namely its role
as implicit collateral for external borrowing. In this context, I evaluate whether the role
of international reserves as collateral can explain the high levels of international reserves
that we see in practice and find that the optimal level is close to the average reserves-
to-GDP ratio in Latin American countries. Additionally, the optimal behavior during
crises implies an increase of reserve holdings before a Sudden Stop and a small reduction
during it, which is coherent with what was observed in the recent Global Financial Crisis.
Finally, an alternative policy of keeping reserves at a constant level equal to its average
value all the time yields very similar result to the optimal policy during sudden stops,
highlighting the stabilizing role of reserves even if Central Banks don’t use them at all.
Chapter 3, “The Real Consequences of Countercyclical Capital Controls”, coauthored
with Savitar Sundaresan, analyzes the effects of capital controls on real activity in Brazil,
the most preeminent case of controls being imposed countercyclically. We find that capi-
tal controls have a significant negative impact on investment. The macro analysis uses a
synthetic control method and finds that investment could have been approximately 20%
higher if controls had not been put in place. The micro analysis uses a panel data ap-
proach and finds that the controls reduced the investment to assets ratio by as much as
40%, with some of its effects mitigated by the extension of subsidized credit by the gov-
ernment through the development bank. These results indicate that the renewed support
for controls since the Great Financial Crisis should be more cautiously evaluated as it
might harm the potential growth rate of Emerging Economies for a long-lasting period.
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Chapter 1
Macroeconomic Effects of Commodity




Terms of trade movements are usually associated with macroeconomic fluctuations in
small open economies but the effects are heterogenous among countries. For example, in
the last commodity price boom, output growth in advanced commodity exporters was
somewhat stable compared to the previous decade, while emerging commodity
exporters growth rate more than doubled on average (see Figure 1.1).1 Given the
relevance that commodities have on these economies, understanding the channels by
which the effect of commodity prices affect economic activity is crucial from a policy
perspective.
This paper evaluates quantitatively the importance of commodity price shocks for
business cycles and the different channels through which these shocks affect small open
commodity producing economies, focusing on the importance of financial frictions in the
transmission of these shocks. My analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I estimate a panel
VAR system for two groups of countries heavily exposed to commodity goods exports,
one containing only advanced and the other only emerging small open economies.2 I
show that commodity price shocks are important sources of business cycles and have
stronger effects on real activity, credit, and country interest rates in emerging countries.
Additionally, including commodity price shocks in a panel structural VAR makes the
contribution of interest rate shocks for real activity fluctuations in emerging economies
to be almost negligible, a result in contrast with what was found in Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006).3 This last result indicates that interest rate shocks
capture the effects of commodity price shocks when they are omitted from the analysis,
leading to an overestimation of their importance for business cycle fluctuations.
1. Commodities represent around 50% of exports and 10% of GDP in both countries as we can see in
Table 1.1.
2. I prefer to use the panel data methodology because it increases the efficiency and power of the analysis
as individual countries’ VARs would have too many parameters compared to the time series length.
3. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006) find that interest rate shocks explain around 30%
of movements in emerging economies aggregate activity at a business cycle frequency.
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Figure 1.1: Commodity Export Prices and Output Growth in Commodity Exporters
Source: IMF Primary Commodity Price System, UN COMTRADE and National Sources.
In the second part of my analysis, I build a multi-sector open economy model with a
banking sector to study the mechanism by which financial frictions can amplify the
effects of commodity price shocks. The key idea in the model is that a commodity price
shock triggers price movements that interact with financial constraints both at firms and
banks, transmitting this shock to the rest of the economy through a change in financial
conditions for all sectors. After a favorable commodity price shock, there is a currency
appreciation, a rise in the price of nontradables and, especially for emerging economies,
a decline in the interest rate charged by foreign lenders due to lower country risk.4 In an
environment where banks are subject to leverage constraints and finance their operation
through foreign borrowing in tradable units but lend locally in nontradable units, a
mismatch arises in banks’ balance sheets. Consequently, the increase in the price of
nontradables reduces banks’ leverage and relaxes their borrowing constraint while the
decrease in the country interest rate reduces their funding costs. Accordingly, bankers
are able to get more funds from foreign investors and expand the supply of credit for the
whole economy, leading in equilibrium to a lower lending rate. Finally, the lower
interest rate reduces the costs related to working capital for firms and leads to a further
boom in the commodity and non-tradable sectors while the effects in the industrial
4. For evidence on the negative comovement between commodity prices and country risk in emerging
economies, see Bastourre et al. (2013) and Fernández, González, and Rodriguez (2015)
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sector are ambiguous, as they have now also more costly inputs. The close relationship
between commodity prices and foreign borrowing by the banking sector in small open
commodity exporters can be seen in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Banking Sector Foreign Financing
Note: The data are the simple average of the sum of external loans and international debt securities vis-a-
vis the banking sector from 1995-2013 normalized for Dec 2003 = 100 for the Emerging (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Peru and South Africa) and Advanced (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway)
main commodity exporters.
Source: BIS locational banking statistics Table 7A.
I estimate the small open economy model with financial frictions using Bayesian
methods for both groups of economies, advanced and emerging, and I show that the
model is able to account for the different effects of commodity price shocks on these two
groups. This framework also allows me to evaluate the quantitative importance of four
previously studied channels through which financial frictions can amplify the effects of
commodity price shocks
1. Working capital channel: the change in working capital costs when the interest
rate moves due to a commodity price shock;
2. Financial accelerator channel: the change in credit supply when banks are subject
4
to leverage constraints for foreign borrowing induced by fluctuations in banks’ net
worth due to commodity prices movements;
3. Balance sheet mismatch channel: the change in banks’ net worth resulting from
movements in the price of nontradables induced by commodity price shocks in the
presence of mismatches in banks’ balance sheets;
4. Country interest rate channel: the change in the country interest rate when
commodity prices move due to a change in the country sovereign risk, especially
for emerging economies.
I conduct a counterfactual analysis and find that the main transmission channel is the
interaction between the working capital and country interest rate channel. Moreover, I
also show that the financial accelerator and balance sheet mismatches in the banking
sector don’t have a relevant quantitative amplification effect.
The small role of borrowing constraints in the transmission of shocks found in this
paper might seem surprising as they have received a lot of attention in the theoretical
literature recently. However, there is little agreement about their quantitative relevance.
On the one hand, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) emphasize the role of
nonlinearities and asymmetries to generate quantitatively relevant amplification arising
from the financial accelerator mechanism. On the other hand, Kocherlakota (2000)
argues that, although they might generate an arbitrarily high degree of amplification,
this theoretical possibility is not robust because, depending on the parameters of the
economy, prices might not respond too much to income shocks. In the same vein,
Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) find that amplification is close to zero for standard values of
capital shares and intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013)
confirm their findings by showing that only shocks that impact considerably prices
directly related to the financial frictions can trigger strong amplification effects. In fact, I
show that the key reason for the small amplification effect in my setting is the small and
short-lived effect on the spread charged by financial intermediaries to firms.
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Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the
relationship with the literature. Section 1.3 describes the data, discusses the main
stylized facts, describes the panel VAR specification and discusses its results. Section 1.4
describes the theoretical framework and the different equilibrium concepts. Section 1.5
details the estimation of the model and presents its main results. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LITERATURE
This section discusses the contribution of this work to three strands of the literature.
Effects of External Shocks in Emerging Economies. This paper contributes to the
literature that studies the effects of external shocks in small open economies. Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006) analyze the effect of interest rate shocks and
find that both US interest rate shocks and country spread shocks are crucial drivers of
business cycle in emerging economies. Mendoza (1995) and Kose (2002) study the effect
of terms of trade shocks by estimating a process for them and feeding it to a small open
economy business cycle model to compute the variance of macroeconomic variables
induced by these shocks. After that, they compare it with the actual variance of the
corresponding variable and find that at least 30% of macroeconomic fluctuations should
be attributed to terms of trade shocks. Lubik and Teo (2005) estimate a DSGE model for
five developed and developing economies and find that world interest rate shocks are
the main driving forces of business cycles in small open economies while terms of trade
shocks are not relevant. However, they acknowledge that their results might be related
to the importance of allowing for a richer production structure to accurately capture the
contribution of terms of trade shocks to business cycle fluctuations, an issue addressed
in this paper. Justiniano and Preston (2010) estimate a structural, small open-economy
model of the Canadian economy and show that it cannot account for the substantial
influence of foreign-sourced disturbances identified in numerous reduced form studies.
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They also show that these results are due to the model’s inability to account for
comovement without generating counter factual implications for the real exchange rate,
the terms of trade and Canadian inflation, which is not true in the setup proposed in this
work. Akinci (2013) uses a panel VAR methodology to show that shocks to global
financial risk are an important source of business cycle fluctuations in emerging
economies. Moreover, the inclusion of global financial risk makes the contribution of the
global risk-free interest rate negligible, although country spread shocks are still an
important source of fluctuations in emerging economies. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2015b) estimate both structural VARs and theoretical models for individual countries to
evaluate terms of trade shocks and find that in the empirical SVAR these shocks explain
around 10 percent of movements in aggregate activity. Moreover, they find that at the
country level there is a disconnect between the empirical and theoretical models in the
importance assigned to terms of trade shocks. I contribute to this literature by showing
that commodity price shocks are relevant sources of business cycle fluctuations in
emerging countries, explaining more than 20 percent of movements in output and more
than 30 percent of movements in investment in these economies. Additionally, contrary
to some previous studies, I find that the response of real activity to commodity price
shocks is similar in the panel VAR and in the theoretical model. I also show that it is
important to consider commodity prices instead of the usual terms of trade indices
based on unit values, because these indices are subject to several biases and endogeneity
issues that are mitigated when we use the former. Finally, I find that the inclusion of
commodity price shocks dampens a lot the contribution of interest rate shocks, which
were previously found to be crucial to account for emerging economies’ business cycles.
There are also some works that focus specifically on commodity price shocks as I do.
Céspedes and Velasco (2012), for example, provide empirical evidence using commodity
price boom and bust episodes that commodity price shocks have a significant impact on
output and investment dynamics and that the impact of those shocks on investment
7
tends to be larger for economies with less developed financial markets, a result in line
with what I find in this work. Charnavoki and Dolado (2014) follow Kilian (2009) to
identify the main global shocks driving world commodity prices using a dynamic factor
model framework and find that a rise in commodity prices unambiguously generates a
positive effect on external balances and commodity currency effects, but that a Dutch
disease effect at business cycle frequencies in the Canadian manufacturing sector is only
detected when the commodity price increase is related to a negative global
commodity-specific shock. Collier and Goderis (2012) use a panel error correction
methodology and show that commodity price booms have unconditional positive
short-term effects on output, but non-agricultural booms in countries with poor
governance have adverse long-run effects which dominate the short-term gains.
Fernández, González, and Rodriguez (2015) embed a commodity sector into a
multi-country business cycle model of small emerging market economies and find that
the estimated model gives an important role to commodity prices when accounting for
aggregate dynamics. Finally, Fornero, Kirchner, and Yany (2016) also study the effects of
commodity price shocks in small open commodity-exporting economies using both a
structural VAR and a theoretical model and find expansionary effects of these shocks
driven by the positive responses of commodity investment that spill over to
non-commodity sectors. I contribute by showing that taking into account explicitly the
role of credit frictions in small open economies helps to account for the different effects
of commodity price shocks among advanced and emerging economies.
Financial Frictions in Emerging Economies. I also contribute to the literature that
studies the role of financial frictions in emerging economies. García-Cicco, Pancrazi, and
Uribe (2010) show that the presence of international financial frictions are key to account
for observed aggregate dynamics in developing countries, especially the
downward-sloping autocorrelation function of the trade balance-to-output ratio, the
excess volatility of consumption, the high volatility of investment, and a volatility of the
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trade balance-to-output ratio comparable to that of output growth. Gertler, Gilchrist,
and Natalucci (2007) build a small open economy model with a financial accelerator
mechanism and show that it accounts for roughly half of the decline in economic activity
in a a quantitative exercise aimed at replicating the key features of the South Korean
experience during the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98. Martins and Salles (2011) build a
small open economy model with the presence of two imperfect credit markets and
calibrate it to Brazilian data to assess different types of credit policies implemented
during the Global Financial Crisis. They find that these policies raised GDP but their
welfare effects depend on how they are funded. Finally, Fernández and Gulan (2014)
embed a financial accelerator into a business cycle model of a small open economy and
estimate it on a panel dataset for emerging economies that merges macroeconomic and
financial data to explain the countercyclicality of interest rates, a feature that is usually
hard to match in traditional models, where the interest rate is either acyclical or
procyclical.
Balance Sheet Mismatches and Cross-border Lending. I also evaluate specifically
the role of balance sheet mismatches in banks in the transmission of external shocks.
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) argue that original sin, the fact that the domestic
currency cannot be used to borrow abroad or borrow long term leads all domestic
investments to have either a currency mismatch or a maturity mismatch. Moreover, this
feature is especially important in emerging markets, where the domestic capital markets
are underdeveloped. Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2007) show that
distinguishing among original sin and debt intolerance with currency mismatches is
important as the problems with which these approaches deal are analytically different.
They also argue that although Chile’s institutions are strong, its performance resembled
much more that of Latin America than that of Australia, which supports the approach I
use in this paper in splitting the countries into emerging and advanced economies
regardless of their fiscal and monetary policy frameworks. Choi and Cook (2004)
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examine the quantitative implications of currency mismatches in banks’ balance sheets
for the conduct of monetary policy in emerging economies and for the dynamic
propagation of macroeconomic shocks in an open economy and find that a monetary
policy that fixes the exchange rate to stabilize bank balance sheets offers greater
macroeconomic stability than a floating exchange rate policy represented by an
inflation-targeting interest rate rule to offset the real effects of sticky prices. Finally,
Hahm, Shyn, and Shin (2013) show that in a lending boom, when credit expansion
outstrips the pool of available retail deposits, banks turn to other sources of funding to
support their credit growth, typically from other banks operating as wholesale lenders in
the capital market. They also find that various measures of noncore liabilities, and
especially liabilities to the foreign sector, serve as a good measure of the vulnerability to
a crisis. Thus, if the commodity boom leads to a strong increase in these foreign
liabilities, it would make these economies more vulnerable to external shocks that could
lead to a collapse in the value of the currency and a credit crisis where lending rates rise
sharply.5
I contribute to these last two branches of the literature by developing a framework to
evaluate quantitatively four commonly proposed transmission channels through which
financial frictions can amplify commodity price shocks (namely the country interest rate,
balance sheet mismatches, the financial accelerator and working capital constraints) and
showing that the financial accelerator and balance sheet mismatches in the banking
sector don’t have a relevant quantitative amplification effect for commodity price shocks
despite the recent attention devoted to these channels. Instead, the bulk of the
differences among advanced and emerging economies are accounted for by the
differences in the response of the country interest rate to these shocks and different
working capital constraints faced by firms.




I first estimate a structural panel VAR for emerging and advanced economies to
evaluate the effects of commodity price shocks. The central finding of this section is that
commodity price shocks are relevant sources of business cycles in small open
commodity producers and have stronger effects on emerging economies with respect to
real activity (output and investment), credit and country interest rates.
1.3.1 Data and Panel VAR Specification
My empirical model takes the form of a first-order VAR:





where ηi is a country fixed effect, i denotes countries and t denotes time period and
yi,t = [y fi,t, yhi,t]
y fi,t = [rUSt , pcmi,t], yhi,t = [gdpi,t, invi,t, tbyi,t, crti,t, ri,t, reeri,t]
rUS denotes the real U.S. interest rate, pcm denotes the country specific real
commodity export price, gdp denotes real gross domestic product, inv denotes real gross
fixed capital formation, tby denotes the trade balance to output ratio, crt denotes real
credit volume to the non-financial private sector, r denotes the country specific interest
rate and reer denotes the real exchange rate. All variables are log deviations from a
log-linear and a log-quadratic trend with the exception of the trade balance to output
ratio and the interest rates, which are detrended in levels. I also remove the sample
mean after detrending for each variable separately. I estimate 2 panel VARs, one for
advanced economies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway) and the other for
emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and South Africa) for the
period 1994:Q1-2013:Q4. The countries selected have commodities representing more
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than 30% of total exports, well developed financial markets and at least 15 years of data.
The data sources are listed in the Appendix.
One departure from the literature that evaluates the effects of terms of trade shocks is
that I prefer to use a constructed real commodity export price instead of the ratio of
export and import unit value indices, which is the usual measure of terms of trade. The
reasons to do that are four. First, Silver (2009) documents several reasons for biases in
unit value indices and finds that the discrepancies between unit value indices and price
indices can be substantial and even have the wrong sign, especially for heterogenous
products, which lead me to focus only on homogeneous commodity product exports.6
Second, unit values that consider a broad range of products are more likely to be
endogenous with respect to country-specific shocks than global commodity prices.
Third, as noted by Chen and Rogoff (2003), the presence of nominal rigidities and
incomplete pass-through make proper identification when we use the usual terms of
trade index close to impossible because these rigidities prevent these measures from
adequately incorporating contemporaneous shocks that induce immediate effects on the
exchange rate, which are important to account for the real effects of commodity price
shocks. Fourth, I do not divide the commodity export price by a commodity import
price index because commodity imports represent on average less than 3% of GDP for
my sample countries. Moreover, a considerable share of these imports is related to
energy products, which have their fluctuations smoothed in most of sample countries
through taxes and subsidies, as we can see in Figure 1.3, and thus their price changes are
not fully transmitted to the real economy.7
6. The sources of bias are (i) the increased product differentiation, which aggravates the bias due to com-
positional quality mix changes; (ii) the lack of ways for dealing with quality change, temporarily missing
values, and seasonal goods with unit value indices; (iii) the increase in trade in services coupled with the
lack of customs data for many sorts of service products; (iv) the impossibility of dealing appropriately with
"unique" goods such as ships with customs data and unit value indices; and (v) when outlier detection and
deletion is automatic and badly applied, such deletions run the risk of missing large price catch-ups due to
the stickiness of many price changes.
7. Di Bella et al. (2015) documents that for the Latin American countries in my sample there is either
an ad hoc price-setting mechanism (Argentina and Brazil) or the presence of a stabilization fund which
smooths price variations (Colombia, Chile and Peru).
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Figure 1.3: Gasoline Prices - US$/Gallon
Real commodity export prices for each country are calculated following Deaton and
Miller (1996) and Chen and Rogoff (2003). See the Appendix for details about their
construction. Table 1.1 shows the commodity exports profile for the countries in the
sample and Figure 1.4 plots the time series for real commodity export prices. As we can
see, although there is some dispersion inside the two groups, their average profile is
similar with respect to commodity exports as a share of total exports and share of GDP.
Moreover, energy products are more relevant for advanced than emerging economies
while the opposite is true for metals and agricultural products. Finally, all prices have an
upward trend beginning in the early 2000s and are highly correlated.
Table 1.2 shows business cycle statistics for sample countries, averaging over
country-specific moments for each of the groups. As expected, all variables are more
volatile in emerging than in advanced economies. Moreover, real activity (output and
investment) and real exchange rates are positively correlated with commodity prices for
both groups. Consistent with previous work, the country interest rate and the trade
balance-to-gdp ratio are countercyclical in emerging economies and procyclical and
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Share of Exports Share of GDP Main Products
Emerging
Argentina 49% 6.3% Soybeans (41%), Crude Oil (12%), Maize (8.9%)
Brazil 44% 4.4% Soybeans (22%), Iron Ore (17%), Sugar (9%)
Chile 64% 18.0% Copper (72%), Fish (9%), Wood (7%)
Colombia 55% 7.5% Crude Oil (45%), Coal (19%), Coffee (18%)
Peru 60% 11.0% Copper (34%), Gold (29%), Zinc (11%)
South Africa 30% 6.3% Coal (23%), Platinum (21%), Iron Ore (10%)
Average 50% 8.9%
Advanced
Australia 63% 10.0% Coal (21%), Iron Ore (15%), Aluminum (10%)
Canada 30% 8.7% Crude Oil (25%), Wood (18%), Natural Gas (16%)
New Zealand 33% 7.2% Wood (21%), Lamb (20%), Beef (16%)
Norway 67% 21.3% Crude Oil (59%), Natural Gas (21%), Fish (7%)
Average 49% 11.2%
Note: The data are the simple average from annual trade data for SITC level 4 groups provided by UN
COMTRADE from 1994-2013. The number in parenthesis is the share of each product in total commodity
exports for each country.
Table 1.1: Country Commodity Exports Profile
Figure 1.4: Real Commodity Export Prices (1994 = 100)
acyclical, respectively, for advanced economies. Finally, the country interest rate has a
positive comovement with commodity prices in emerging economies and a negative
comovement in advanced economies, a fact that motivates the inclusion of commodity
prices in the country interest rate equation in the theoretical framework.
I identify the panel VAR by a simple recursive structure, imposing that the matrix A is
lower triangular. Moreover, I assume that foreign variables are completely exogenous
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Emerging Advanced
σX ρ(Xt, PCMt) ρ(Xt, Yt) σX ρ(Xt, PCMt) ρ(Xt, Yt)
Y 0.03 0.50 1.00 0.01 0.23 1.00
I 0.11 0.44 0.82 0.07 0.41 0.68
TBY 2.4% 0.18 -0.40 1.7% 0.25 -0.06
Crt 0.13 -0.09 0.47 0.04 0.08 0.28
RUS 0.01 0.06 0.35 0.01 0.08 0.28
PCM 0.15 1.00 0.50 0.12 1.00 0.23
R 0.03 -0.23 -0.23 0.01 0.23 0.36
REER 0.11 0.23 0.48 0.06 0.52 0.15
Note: The data are the simple average of the indicators for the Emerging (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Peru and South Africa) and Advanced (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway) main com-
modity exporters. The data sources are listed in the Appendix. The data are sampled quarterly from
1994:Q1-2013:Q4. The columns labeled Y, I, TBY, Crt, RUS, PCM, R and REER refer, respectively, to de-
trended output, investment, trade balance-to-gdp ratio, real credit, US real interest rate, real commodity
export price, country real interest rate and real effective exchange rate.
Table 1.2: Business Cycle Statistics
and that real commodity export prices have no effect on the U.S. interest rate.8 The
assumption that commodity price shocks are unrelated to home variables relies on the
fact that, at least at business cycle frequencies, commodity price fluctuations are
typically more sensitive to short-term demand imbalances. Moreover, with the exception
of Chile, which is the world’s largest copper producer, and South Africa, a big exporter
of precious metals, the countries in the sample have commodity exports distributed over
a fairly diffuse set of products and, at least for their main export products, have
considerable competition from other countries. Additionally, for Chile and South Africa,
Chen, Rogoff, and Rossi (2010) show that the exogeneity assumption holds using the
Hausmann test for endogeneity.9 Finally, innovations in the U.S. interest rate have a
contemporaneous effect on the real commodity export prices to take into account the
phenomenon of financialization of commodity markets (see for example Cheng and
Xiong (2014)).
I use the least square dummy variable estimator to estimate the panel VAR for each
8. Relaxing this assumption does not change the main results.
9. Jacks and Stuermer (2015) also find that demand shocks strongly dominate supply shocks as the main
drivers of metal and agricultural commodity prices.
15
group. As T >>> N, the LSDV strategy is preferred to GMM estimators as it has better
finite sample properties and efficiency, especially if the degree of cross-section to time
series variation is big. Also, with T large, Nickel (1981) critique regarding the bias of the
LSDV estimator is less important. I use the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) to select
the lag length and get p = 2 as optimal. I calculate the error bands using bootstrap
methods.
1.3.2 Main Results
Figure 1.5 shows the impulse response functions for a 10% positive shock in
commodity prices in both advanced and emerging economies. Commodity price shocks
have a much larger effect on output, investment and real credit in emerging economies
while effects on the trade balance and real exchange rate are similar. Finally, the effects
on the country specific real interest rate are also significantly negative and much
stronger for emerging economies.
Figure 1.5: Impulse response to a 10% commodity export price shock.
Note: Marked black (solid red) lines show point estimates of impulse responses for emerging (advanced)
economies; and 68% and 95% confidence bands are depicted with dark-gray and light-gray shaded areas,
respectively. Bootstrap confidence bands are based on 10,000 repetitions.
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The impulse responses for a 2% positive shock in the country-specific real interest rate
are shown in Figure 1.6.10 The effects on emerging and advanced economies are as
expected, with the exception of output in advanced economies, which shows a small
increase after the shock. Again, the effects on emerging economies are much stronger for
the same size of shocks, except for the trade balance, where the effect on advanced
economies is bigger, and the real exchange rate, where we see a depreciation in emerging
economies and an appreciation in advanced economies. This last result might be related
to the fact that increases in country specific interest rates in emerging economies are
usually due to capital outflows, which also depreciate the exchange rate, while in
advanced economies they are mainly due to monetary policy tightening, which attracts
capital flows. This fact might also explain why we see an initial increase in investment
and the small increase in output in these economies.
Figure 1.6: Impulse response to a 2% country-specific interest rate shock.
Note: Marked black (solid red) lines show point estimates of impulse responses for emerging (advanced)
economies; and 68% and 95% confidence bands are depicted with dark-gray and light-gray shaded areas,
respectively. Bootstrap confidence bands are based on 10,000 repetitions.
10. The standard deviation of the emerging economies’ country specific interest rate is close to 2%. I use
the same shock size for advanced economies to be able to compare the results.
17
To understand the contribution of each shock for different variables, I perform a
variance decomposition of the forecast errors. Figure 1.7 shows the results. Shocks to
real commodity export prices and the country-specific real interest rate are more
important for real output and investment in emerging economies. According to my
estimates, innovations in real commodity export prices are responsible for about 23% of
movements in aggregate output in emerging economies and about 7% in advanced
economies, while shocks to the country-specific real interest rate orthogonal to
commodity price shocks are responsible for about 5% of movements in emerging
economies and less than 1% in advanced economies. For real fixed investment,
commodity export price innovations are responsible for around 32% of fluctuations in
emerging economies and about 15% in advanced economies, while shocks to the
country-specific real interest rate are responsible for about 2% of movements in
emerging economies and about 1% in advanced economies. Taking these two results
together, external shocks explain about 28% of output fluctuations and more than 30% of
investment fluctuations in emerging economies, while about only 8% of output
fluctuations and 17% of investment fluctuations in advanced economies, illustrating the
much bigger importance of external shocks for the former economies. Moreover,
including commodity export prices considerably reduces the contribution of
country-specific interest rate shocks to fluctuations in emerging economies when
compared to previous work. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006), for
example, find that interest rate shocks explain around 30% of movements in emerging
economies aggregate activity at a business cycle frequency. This indicates that, at least
for commodity exporters, when commodity price shocks are omitted from the analysis
the country interest rate shocks capture their effects, leading to an overestimation of
their importance for business cycle fluctuations.
In the next section, I present the structural model to evaluate more directly the
channels that can explain these results.
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Figure 1.7: Forecast error variance decomposition at different horizons.
Note: Marked black (solid red) lines show point estimates of forecast error variance decomposition for
emerging (advanced) economies for the real commodity export price (first row) and country-specific real
interest rate (second row) at different horizons.
1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section I present a model to evaluate the contribution of different financial
frictions to the transmission of commodity price shocks. The theoretical framework
consists of a small open economy version of a dynamic stochastic model with a financial
sector similar to the one proposed in Gertler and Karadi (2011). I enrich the model in
several dimensions: (i) I consider 3 different sectors (tradable final goods, nontradable
goods and intermediate commodities that can be either used in the local production or
exported) that are subject to independent shocks; (ii) the country interest rate can be
affected by commodity prices either directly or indirectly through their effects on foreign
indebtedness motivated by the results in the panel VAR analysis; (iii) I have working
capital constraints for firms, which lead to a wedge in firms’ decisions to hire labor and
invest, and which transmit interest rate changes to the real economy; (iv) banks get
funds from international lenders, subject to a leverage constraint and denominated in
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tradable units; and (v) banks lend to firms in nontradable units, giving rise to a
mismatch in their balance sheets, which interacts with the leverage constraint to amplify
the shocks. The leverage constraint arises due to an agency problem, which leads banks
to be limited in their capacity to get funds from abroad. When this constraint is binding,
credit to the non-financial private sector is limited. In this environment, a positive
commodity price shock that might lead to a decrease in the interest rate for foreign
borrowing and an increase in the relative price of nontradables would strengthen the
bank’s balance sheet and consequently allow them to expand borrowing from
international investors and lending to the productive sector, amplifying the effect of the
shock and transmitting it to the whole economy.
1.4.1 Households
Households are composed of a constant fraction f of workers and (1− f ) of bankers.
Workers supply labor to firms in exchange for wages while bankers manage financial
intermediaries and transfer net earnings to the household. There is perfect insurance
between household members. The consumption basket is a CES aggregator with
elasticity of substitution µ between tradable cTt and nontradable goods c
N
t :
ct ≡ A(cTt , cNt ) = [χ(cTt )1−1/µ + (1− χ)(cNt )1−1/µ]
1
1−1/µ
Households have preferences described by a utility function similar to the one
defined in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) with the addition of internal
habit formation as can be seen below:
U(ct, ct−1, hCM,t, hT,t, hN,t) =
(
















where σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, b ∈ [0, 1) governs the degree of
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internal habit and (ωCM, ωT, ωN) determine the Frisch elasticity of labor supply for each
sector. In the absence of habit formation, GHH preferences eliminate the wealth effect on
labor supply. Consequently, if b is small, anticipated future income does not affect
current labor supply, which will depend mainly on the current wage.
Households are also the owners of firms, receiving all their net profits, and can
borrow directly from abroad in international markets without any frictions. Thus, the
period-by-period budget constraint of households in terms of numeraire tradable final



















where d∗Ht denotes the stock of one-period debt acquired in period t and due in
period t+1, R∗t is the interest rate charged for foreign borrowing, wj,t is the wage and π
j
t
is the net cash flow received from firms on each sector j, and πBt are the profits sent by
bankers to the household.









I assume that labor supply is chosen one period in advance, motivated by the fact that
output barely moves initially after a commodity price shock in the panel VAR analysis.
Thus, the consumption of tradables cTt and nontradables c
N
t , debt holdings d
∗H
t and labor
supply hj,t+1 are given by maximizing the discounted expected future flow of utility
using a subjective discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) subject to the budget constraint and the
no-Ponzi scheme constraint. Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
budget constraint as λt, the first order conditions of the household’s problem are































































1.4.2 Commodity and Final Non-Tradable Goods Producers
Commodity and final non-tradable goods producers have a Cobb-Douglas production
function that uses capital and labor as inputs. Following Uribe and Yue (2006), I assume
that firms face a working capital constraint and thus, for each unit of wage payments
and investment, firms must hold η units of a non-interest bearing asset, denoted mjt.
Firms can borrow from banks at a rate Rt to cover working capital expenses. Firms also
choose investment one-period in advance, motivated by the fact that investment barely
moves initially after a commodity price shock in the panel VAR analysis. Finally, firms










Firms discount their profits using the household’s marginal utility of wealth because




















































j[wj,thj,t + ij,t] (1.15)
where j = {N, CM} represents the firm’s sector, where N stands for the final
non-tradable goods sector and CM for the commodity goods sector.

















































) = Et[λt+1(1 + η jξ jt+1)] (1.18)


























which shows that the working capital constraint introduces a distortion that elevates
the effective cost of labor and investment for each sector and makes optimal production
decisions depend on the interest rate charged by banks.
1.4.3 Final Tradable Goods Producers
Besides using capital and labor as inputs, final tradable goods producers also have an
additional input, commodity intermediate goods. I assume again that firms have a
Cobb-Douglas production function, choose investment one period in advance and face
investment adjustment costs and a working capital constraint, and thus the firm’s











































t ≥ ηT[wthT,t + pCMt cmt + iT,t] (1.26)
The first order conditions of the firm’s problem are then



















































= Et[λt+1(1 + ηTξTt+1)] (1.30)

















and, as before, combining the two last equations shows that the working capital










In addition to her accumulated net worth, n, a banker can obtain capital from foreign
investors, d∗B, in the form of one-period non-contingent debt denominated in tradable
goods units. The assets held by the banks are loans provided to firms in different sectors
in the form of one-period non-contingent debt denominated in non-tradable goods units.
As the bank borrows in tradable units and lends in non-tradable units, this gives rise to a





t = nt + d
∗B
t (1.34)
Intermediaries borrowing at time t pay the non-contingent real gross return R∗t at
t + 1. Net worth next period is given by the difference between realized returns on assets








− R∗t d∗Bt (1.35)
where Rt is the gross return on loans.
Bankers’ borrowing from abroad is limited to a multiple φB − 1 of their net worth.
Combining this borrowing limit with the bank’s balance sheet equation, we get the
following leverage constraint: 11
11. This leverage constraint can be motivated by a moral hazard problem as in Gertler and Karadi (2011)
where, at the beginning of each period, bankers can choose to divert a fraction λ of their assets and transfer
them back to the household of which he or she is a member. This limited enforcement problem introduces
an incentive constraint that requires the bank’s continuation value to be higher than the value of diverted
funds and leads to a leverage constraint similar to what I have here, with the difference that the parameter









As long as the the bank earns a risk adjusted return that is greater than its funding
costs, it is optimal for the banker to keep accumulating assets until exiting the business.
At any point of time, there is a probability 1− θ that a banker exits the financial sector
and becomes a worker, transferring all the accumulated net worth to the household.
Transfers to new bankers amount to the time invariant fraction νB/(1− θ) of the
value of assets of exiting bankers:
Nnt+1 =
νB




Aggregate net worth depends on both existing bankers’ net worth and the net worth
of new bankers. Since a fraction θ of bankers survives each period, the net worth next




















1.4.5 International Capital Markets and Exogenous Processes
I follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and assume that the economy faces a
debt-elastic interest rate premium. Moreover, to capture the effects of commodity prices
on the country premium that were found in the panel VAR analysis, I also assume that
the interest rate depends on the level of the real commodity export price with respect to
its steady state value as follows12
12. Bastourre et al. (2013) and Fernández, González, and Rodriguez (2015) show that there is a strong
negative comovement between interest rates and commodity prices in emerging economies, which moti-
vates the inclusion of commodity prices directly in the interest rate equation. They also show that this
negative association pattern is not only explained by the fact that commodity prices are one of the most
relevant fundamentals for commodity exporters’ bond spreads but also that reductions in international in-
terest rates and global risk appetite, rises in quantitative global liquidity measures and equity returns, and
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R∗t = R̄∗ + ψ
D(ed
∗
t−d̄∗ − 1) + ψCM(epCMt − p̄CM − 1) + εr∗t (1.39)
where d∗ is total foreign debt from both workers and bankers and d̄∗ is its steady state




The productivity for each sector is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with normally
distributed shocks:
log(aCM,t+1) = ρCMlog(aCM,t) + εCMt (1.40)
log(aT,t+1) = ρTlog(aT,t) + εTt (1.41)
log(aN,t+1) = ρN log(aN,t) + εNt (1.42)
Finally, the real commodity export price is assumed to be completely exogenous and
follows an AR(2) process around its steady state, value with normally distributed
shocks:13
log(pCMt+1)− log( p̄CM) = ρPCM1 log(pCMt − log( p̄CM)) + ρPCM2 log(pCMt−1 − log( p̄CM)) + εPCMt
(1.43)
1.4.6 Market Clearing





US dollar depreciations tend to diminish spreads of emerging economies and strengthen commodity prices
simultaneously. This specification captures these effects in a reduced form manner.
13. I use an AR(2) process for the real commodity export price to be coherent with the optimal lag length
found in the panel VAR analysis.
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it = iCM,t + iT,t + iN,t (1.45)
tbTt = y
T






t − cmT,t) (1.47)








cat = tbt − r∗t d∗t = d∗t+1 − d∗t (1.50)
1.4.7 Equilibrium Conditions and Numerical Solution
The competitive equilibrium is described by a system of nonlinear equilibrium
conditions that cannot be solved analytically, so I use perturbation techniques to solve it
numerically. The method consists in first solving numerically for the deterministic
steady state of the economy when the leverage constraint in the banking sector is always
binding, and then performing a first order approximation of the system of equations
around this steady state.14 All the equilibrium conditions and the details of the steady
state calculation are shown in the Appendix.
1.4.8 Transmission Channels
It is now useful to describe the mechanism that ties commodity price shocks, financial
frictions, and real economic activity. An increase in commodity price shocks is
transmitted to the rest of the economy via four distinctive financial channels that are
usually studied in the literature. First, if an increase in the price of commodities reduces
the interest rate charged by financial intermediaries from firms, this reduction will lead
14. This assumption allows me to use perturbation methods to solve the model. Otherwise, I would have
to rely in other solution methods which are more time consuming and thus would make the estimation
much more difficult.
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to an increase in output and investment because the working capital constraint
introduces a wedge in firms decisions to hire labor and invest which depends on the
level of the interest rate. I call this channel the working capital channel.
Second, as the banking sector is subject to a leverage constraint, if the net worth of the
bank increases after a rise in commodity prices, banks can borrow more from foreign
lenders. Consequently, the supply of credit for firms will also expand and the interest
rate charged by financial intermediaries will decrease, inducing an expansion in credit
and real activity. This is the financial accelerator channel. Third, and related to the
previous one, because the price of nontradables increases when commodity prices go up,
the value of banks’ assets will also rise, which generates an expansion in their net worth
as the value of banks’ liabilities stays constant. This increase in the net worth interacts
with the leverage constraint and spurs additional borrowing from abroad, which leads
again to an expansion in output and investment. This is the balance sheet mismatch
channel. Figure 1.8 illustrates the interaction between these two channels.
Figure 1.8: Balance sheet mismatch and financial accelerator channels
Fourth, a rise in the price of commodities reduces the country foreign indebtedness
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through the increase in exports and consequently lowers the country interest rate.
Moreover, especially for emerging economies, there is an additional reduction on
interest rates due to lower country risk and consequently an increase in capital flows. I
call this channel the country interest rate channel.
In the next section I will estimate the model to be able to evaluate which of these four
channels are more relevant quantitatively for the transmission of commodity price
shocks.
1.5 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The model is estimated using the same dataset used in the Panel VAR and Bayesian
methods. First I describe the estimation strategy; and then I present diagnostics
regarding model fit and evaluate the estimated model, comparing its properties with the
panel VAR estimated for each group of countries and analyzing the transmission
mechanism.
1.5.1 Model Estimation
I denote the vector of model parameters by θ ∈ Θ. It is useful to partition the
parameter vector into θ = [θ1, θ2], where θ1 represents the set of parameters that are
calibrated while θ2 represents the set of parameters that are estimated.
θ1 = [d̄∗, p̄CM, r̄∗, β, µ, δ, χ, σ, αCM, αT, αN, γT, ωCM, ωT, ωN, νB]
θ2 = [ψ
D, ψCM, ηCM, ηT, ηN, φB, θB, b, φCM, φT, φN]
I choose the calibrated parameters using both long-run data relations from emerging
and advanced economies and parameter values that are standard in related business
cycle studies. Table 1.3 shows the calibrated parameter values. I set the parameter d̄∗ to
induce a steady-state value of the trade balance-to-output ratio of 1% for emerging
economies and 0% for advanced economies. I set p̄CM to get a steady-state value of the
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Parameter Value Source/target
Steady-state foreign debt d̄∗ = 0.12 (0.0) TB-to-output ratio = 1% (0%)
Steady-state pcm p̄CM = 0.69 TBCM-to-output ratio = 10%
Interest rate r̄∗ = 0.02 (0.01) Average value
Discount factor β = 0.98(0.99) β = 1/(1 + r∗)
At. elasticity of substitution µ = 0.5 Akinci (2011)
Weight on tradables in CES χ = 0.35 Share of nontradable output = 50%
In. elasticity of substitution σ = 2 Standard value
Labor curvature ωCM = ωT = ωN = 1.455 Standard value
Depreciation rate δ = 2.5% Standard value
Capital share ratio αN = 0.25 Labor share of income = 75%
Capital share ratio αT = αCM = 0.35 Labor share of income = 70%
Commodity input share γT = 0.05 Commodity inputs = 5%
Transfer rate νB = 0.01 Small share of total assets
AR1 coefficient pcm ρ1 = 1.29(1.32) Panel VAR
AR2 coefficient pcm ρ2 = −0.40(−0.45) Panel VAR
Std pcm shock σpcm = 0.067(0.053) Panel VAR
Table 1.3: Calibrated Parameter Values
commodity exports-to-output ratio of 10%. I set the steady-state interest rate to 1% for
advanced economies and 2% for emerging economies and β accordingly as 1/(1 + r̄∗)
for each group of economies. I set the elasticity of substitution between tradable and
nontradable final goods to 0.5, which is in the range found by Akinci (2011). I set the
depreciation rate δ at 2.5%, which implies an annual depreciation rate around 10%. I set
χ to 0.35 to have a nontradable final goods production-to-output ratio around 50%. The
intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ is set to 2 and the labor curvature parameters
ωCM, ωT and ωN are set to 1.455, which are fairly standard values. Using the results
from Na (2015) and Uribe (1997), the capital share ratios αCM and αT are set to 0.35 while
αN is set to 0.25 to get the labor share of income close to 70% in the first two sectors and
75% in the latter, and γT is set to 0.05. Finally, I set νB to 1% to make new bankers start
with a small share of total assets.15
The parameters in θ2 are estimated using as observables the same set of home
15. I don’t estimate this parameter because it is not well identified when it is estimated together with the
other banking sector parameters.
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variables used in the panel VAR, namely real gross domestic product, real gross fixed
capital formation, the trade balance to output ratio, real credit concessions to the
non-financial private sector, the country-specific real interest rate and the real effective
exchange rate, using the same detrending method. I prefer to use exactly the same data
used in the panel VAR analysis to check how closely the model can replicate its results. I
also add measurement errors to all observables.
I use the Bayesian methods surveyed in An and Schorfheide (2007) to estimate the
vector θ2, the persistence and standard deviations of the shocks and the standard
deviations of the measurement errors. Conditional on the distribution of the exogenous
shocks and after computing the first order approximation of the model around the
steady state assuming that the banking sector leverage constraint is always binding, the
model defines a state space system which generates a likelihood function that can be
used to transform prior distributions for the structural parameters into a posterior
distribution using the Bayes Theorem. As it is not feasible to characterize the posterior
distribution analytically, we have to use computational techniques to generate draws
from the posterior and then approximate posterior expectations by Monte Carlo
averages. I use a Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm implemented in
Schorfheide (2000) to compute the posterior distribution and evaluate the marginal
likelihood of the model. I use priors that are standard in the literature for most of the
parameters while for the parameters related to the financial frictions I choose very loose
and uninformative prior.
Particularly, the coefficients of the country interest rate process (ψD, ψCM) are
assumed to follow uniform distributions, with the first ranging from 0.00001 to 0.5, and
the second ranging from -0.05 to 0; the working capital constraint parameters
(ηCM, ηT, ηN), a gamma distribution with mean 2 and standard deviation of 1; the
leverage constraint parameter (φB), an uniform distribution ranging from 2 to 20; the
parameter that governs the survival rate of bankers (θB), a beta distribution with mean
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0.7 and standard deviation of 0.1; the parameter that governs internal habit formation
(b), a beta distribution with mean 0.75 and standard deviation of 0.1; the sectoral
investment adjustment costs parameters (φCM, φT, φN), a gamma distribution with mean
10 and standard deviation of 5; the persistence of the autoregressive processes
(ρCM, ρT, ρN), a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.2; and the
standard errors of the innovations (σr
∗
, σCM, σT, σN), an inverse-gamma distribution
with mean 0.1 and a standard deviation of 2. Finally, uniform prior distributions were
chosen for the innovations of the measurement errors, restricted to account for at most
10% of the average variance of each corresponding observable time series. Table 1.4
reports the priors with the average of the posterior means for θ2 for each group of
countries and all the prior and posterior plots are in a separate Computational
Appendix. Comparing the posterior distributions with the prior distributions we can
conclude that the data are informative about all estimated parameters.
1.5.2 Model Fit and Analysis
This subsection analyzes the properties of the model. First, I compare the impulse
response functions of the baseline estimation with the ones obtained from the Panel
VARs. In general, the impulse responses generated by the model are close to the ones
generated by the VARs. Then, I do some counterfactual exercises to evaluate the key
channels through which the results are obtained, especially the different responses of
emerging and advanced economies to commodity price shocks.
Figures 9-11 show the results for the impulse responses for a 10% positive shock to
commodity prices comparing, respectively, the model and the panel VAR results for
emerging and advanced economies, and the model results for both groups of countries.
Model estimates are computed in two steps: first, I compute the mean posterior IRF for
each country; then I take the average across countries for each group.
The model matches well the behavior of most of the variables after the commodity
34
Advanced Emerging
Parameter Prior Para 1 Para 2 Posterior Mean Posterior Mean
ψD Uniform 0.00001 0.50 0.016 0.077
ψCM Uniform -0.05 0 -0.006 -0.014
ηCM Gamma 2.0 1.0 2.9 2.5
ηT Gamma 2.0 1.0 1.7 1.9
ηN Gamma 2.0 1.0 1.2 2.1
φB Uniform 2.0 20 2.06 2.04
θB Beta 0.70 0.10 0.72 0.75
b Beta 0.75 0.10 0.46 0.45
φCM Gamma 10 5 10.6 10.3
φT Gamma 10 5 1.8 4.6
φN Gamma 10 5 11.3 9.3
ρCM Beta 0.50 0.20 0.73 0.88
ρT Beta 0.50 0.20 0.89 0.87
ρN Beta 0.50 0.20 0.82 0.84
σr
∗
Inverse Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.01 0.02
σCM Inverse Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.16 0.57
σT Inverse Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.03 0.05
σN Inverse Gamma 0.10 2.0 0.01 0.02
Note: Para 1 and Para 2 are the extreme values for the Uniform distribution; and mean and standard devi-
ation for Beta, Gamma and Inverse Gamma distributions. Posterior statistics are computed using 400,000
draws from the posterior distribution of model’s parameters.
Table 1.4: Prior and Posterior Distribution of θ2
price shock when compared with the results obtained in the panel VAR analysis for both
group of countries. Both in the panel VAR and the theoretical model we have stronger
responses of output, investment, credit and country interest rate in emerging economies.
The key difference between the model and the panel VAR is the behavior of the trade
balance in emerging economies, which increases more in the model than in the data; and
the real exchange rate in advanced economies, which appreciates more in the panel VAR
than in the model. Moreover, output and investment are more persistent in the model
than in the data. Finally, credit increases more rapidly in the model than in the panel
VAR, which might indicate some type of time-to-lending feature in reality.
The estimated model can then be used to ask which channel is responsible for the
different results between emerging and advanced economies. I analyze what happens if
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Figure 1.9: Impulse response to a 10% commodity export price shock - Emerging Economies.
Note: Marked black (solid red) lines show point estimates of impulse responses for emerging economies
for the panel VAR (model); and 68% and 95% confidence bands for the panel VAR estimates are depicted
with dark-gray and light-gray shaded areas, respectively. Bootstrap confidence bands are based on 10,000
repetitions. Model estimates are the average of impulse responses across countries.
(i) there isn’t any mismatch in banks balance sheets in emerging countries; (ii) the
financial accelerator is not present in the banking sector in emerging economies; and (iii)
emerging economies have the same working capital constraints and interest rate
processes as the average of the estimates for advanced economies.
Balance sheet mismatch channel. I first recompute the impulse responses
eliminating the mismatch in banks’ balance sheets by making them lend in tradable
units to firms. The results can be seen in Figure 1.12. The impulse responses are almost
identical to the baseline scenario, with the exception of the interest rate spread, which
increases on impact. Consequently, we can conclude that quantitatively the role of
balance sheet mismatches is minor in this environment.
Financial accelerator channel. Now I eliminate the leverage constraint and
consequently the entire banking sector, as without the constraint the model is equivalent
to one where firms borrow directly from abroad. The impulse responses can be seen in
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Figure 1.10: Impulse response to a 10% commodity export price shock - Advanced Economies.
Note: Marked black (solid red) lines show point estimates of impulse responses for advanced economies
for the panel VAR (model); and 68% and 95% confidence bands for the panel VAR estimates are depicted
with dark-gray and light-gray shaded areas, respectively. Bootstrap confidence bands are based on 10,000
repetitions. Model estimates are the average of impulse responses across countries.
Figure 1.11: Impulse response to a 10% commodity export price shock - Model Comparison.
Note: Marked black (solid red) lines show point estimates of impulse responses for emerging (advanced)
economies for the model. Model estimates are the average of impulse responses across countries. Model
estimates are the average of impulse responses across countries.
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Figure 1.12: Impulse response to a 10% commodity export price shock - No Mismatch.
Note: Marked black (solid red) lines show point estimates of impulse responses for emerging economies
for the model in the baseline (alternative) scenario. Model estimates are the average of impulse responses
across countries.
Figure 1.13. The results are again very similar to the baseline scenario, with actually a
stronger growth in credit when we don’t have the financial accelerator in place.
Moreover, the increase on investment is also stronger but less persistence. Thus, we can
also conclude that, on top of the minor role of balance sheet mismatches, the whole
banking sector is not important quantitatively for the transmission of commodity price
shocks in the setup of this paper.
Country interest rate and working capital channels. Finally, I evaluate if the country
interest and working capital channels can explain the different effects in emerging and
advanced economies. To do that, I calibrate the firms’ working capital parameters and
country interest rate process for each emerging country using the average obtained in
the advanced countries and I keep all the other estimated parameters equal to the
baseline estimation. The results can be see in Figure 1.14. It shows that the bulk of the
difference in impulse responses to commodity price shocks is explained by the
interaction between the working capital and the interest rate channel.
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Figure 1.13: Impulse response to a 10% commodity export price shock - No Leverage Constraint.
Note: Marked black (solid red) lines show point estimates of impulse responses for emerging economies
for the model in the baseline (alternative) scenario. Model estimates are the average of impulse responses
across countries.
Figure 1.14: Impulse response to a 10% commodity export price shock - Working Capital Constraint parameters and
R∗ process for Advanced Economies.
Note: Marked black (solid red) lines show point estimates of impulse responses for emerging economies
for the model in the baseline (alternative) scenario. Model estimates are the average of impulse responses
across countries.
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It is clear from the results that the most relevant channels for the transmission of
commodity price shocks are the interest rate and working capital channels. Moreover,
turning off the balance sheet mismatch and the financial accelerator channels almost do
not change the impulse responses, which leads to the conclusion that although
theoretically plausible and heavily explored after the recent financial crisis, these
frictions do not have relevant quantitative implications in the environment proposed in
this paper. This result is related to the response of interest rate spreads, which are small
and temporary. Consequently, most of the effects stem from the country interest rate,
which experiences a strong and persistent reduction after a commodity price shock; and
from differences in working capital constraints, which are how changes in interest rates
are transmitted to the real economy through the wedge that they create in firms’ hiring
and investment decisions.
1.6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper uses two different methodologies to evaluate the effects of commodity
price shocks on small open commodity exporters. First, I estimate a panel VAR and
show that commodity price shocks are important sources of business cycles in small
open commodity exporters and their effect on real activity, credit and country interest
rate is stronger on emerging than on advanced economies. After that, I propose a
theoretical framework to evaluate the contribution of different financial frictions to the
amplification of commodity price shocks. The model is a three-sector small open
economy model with financial intermediaries to be able to account for the dynamics of
small open commodity producers. I estimate the model using Bayesian methods and
show that it is able to account for the different behavior of emerging and advanced
economies, generating impulse responses that are similar to the ones generated by the
panel VAR. Moreover, using the estimated model to evaluate the most important
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financial friction for the amplification of commodity price shocks, I find that the
interaction between their effect on the country interest rate through a lower country risk
and the presence of different working capital constraints explains the bulk of the
difference in the effects on real activity and credit among emerging and advanced
economies. Additionally, the presence of balance sheet mismatches and leverage
constraints for foreign borrowing in the banking sector do not play a significant role in
the transmission of commodity price shocks to the real economy.
The quantitatively small role of the financial accelerator is coherent with previous
works that have evaluated this issue (Kocherlakota (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll
(2004) for example). More recently, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) argued that
nonlinearities and asymmetries are crucial to generate quantitatively relevant
amplification and thus a full characterization of system dynamics far away from the
steady state is needed to get accurate results because in that case prices would move
more strongly. However, the rich environment proposed in this paper makes it
impracticable to work with higher order approximations if we want to perform Bayesian
estimation. On the other hand, other features that might lead to a stronger and more
persistent effect on spreads such as shocks to net worth, a maturity mismatch in banks’
balance sheets, or a time-varying leverage constraint might also make the financial
accelerator more important quantitatively. These are planned for future research.
There are other dimensions in which the model could be extended. First, I do not
consider any countercyclical policies that might be implemented by governments.
Understanding how different monetary and fiscal policy measures could interact with
the channels studied in this work would allow a more complete evaluation of the
transmission mechanism of commodity price shocks. Moreover, I would be able to study
optimal monetary and fiscal policies in countries where this particular shocks are very
important. Second, the fact that the main transmission channel is the effect on the
interest rate for foreign borrowing might give additional support to countercyclical
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capital control policies as the ones advocated recently by the IMF and several authors
(see for example Ostry et al. (2011), Costinot, Lorenzoni, and Werning (2014),
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2015a) and many others). In fact, Chapter 3 of this dissertation
shows that the imposition of countercyclical capital controls in Brazil had real effects,
especially in investment, a result in line with my findings. However, a welfare analysis
of the effects of capital controls is beyond the scope of this work and would depend also
on which sectors are the most affected by these policies and the externalities generated
by them. While all these issues would require an even more comprehensive framework,




Constraints, and Systemic Sudden Stops
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
Although we have seen a remarkable increase in the hoarding of international
reserves in emerging markets, this practice has been subject of an intense debate. Some
authors argue that countries have over-invested in reserves (Rodrik (2006)) while others
see this strong buildup as the optimal response for the possible feedback effects of
balance of payments crisis (Mendoza (2006)).
This paper proposes a new motive for international reserves accumulation, namely its
role as implicit collateral for external borrowing in a small open economy subject to
external financial shocks. Although policy makers and financial market participants
have often thought that international reserves can serve as collateral for external
borrowing, this role has not been formally evaluated before.1 I evaluate it by including
international reserves as collateral for external borrowing in a small open economy
model with credit constraints, similar to those in Mendoza (2002) and Bianchi (2011). In
this context, I want to understand whether the role of international reserves as collateral
for foreign borrowing can explain their high levels in emerging economies and analyze
the behavior of macroeconomic variables in crises in such an environment.
My framework sheds some light on the puzzling fact that emerging markets hold
very high levels of international reserves and foreign liabilities simultaneously and these
holdings are positively correlated, as we can see in Figure 2.1.2 In this setting, having
these liquid assets as collateral allows agents to borrow more funds than would be
possible just by selling the assets because it solves an asymmetric problem about the
value of resources available at the time of repayment, especially during periods of global
1. There is also some anecdotal evidence regarding this relation. Financial Times, for example, wrote
that "Brazil’s booming economy, the fact that the country became a net creditor in international markets
supporting the credit-worthiness of the corporate sector and its underdeveloped domestic capital markets
lead to an impressive performance in corporate issuance since 2007." (Chart of the week: Brazil corporate
debt).
2. The correlation between the two variables is 0.4 in the sample of 33 countries shown in Figure 2.1.
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financial distress when there is a strong desire for liquidity by foreign investors.3 Thus,
the government may choose to pay the cost of holding elevated levels of international
reserves during normal times to relax the credit constraint when the economy is hit by
an external financial shock.4 This policy action allows consumers to hold much more
debt than it would be possible otherwise and softens the drastic impact of these negative
exogenous shocks on consumption.
Figure 2.1: Net Foreign Liabilities ex-IR and International Reserves (% of GDP)
Note: The data are the simple average sampled annually from 1991:2011. All variables are expressed in
percentage points of GDP.
Source: Authors’ computations based on the updated and extended version of the dataset constructed by
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
I also provide a formal explanation to the recent behavior of international reserves
during the Global Financial Crisis. Contrary to the results of almost all models that try to
determine the adequate level of international reserves, most countries had a small and
3. Siritto (2016) also has a model where the asset is worth more for banks than its dividend stream as
it allows them to invest in risky loans which, on top of paying dividends, resolve the banks’ maturity
mismatch problem and relax a borrowing constraint.
4. Rodrik (2006) estimates the income loss due to reserve accumulation in developing countries to be
close to 1% of GDP.
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short-lived international reserves depletion during the GFC, rebuilding their stocks very
quickly.5 Due to this fact, Aizenman and Sun (2012) stated that during the Global
Financial Crisis the "fear of losing reserves seems to play a key role in shaping the actual
use of international reserves by emerging markets".6 Although this could lead to a
reevaluation of the role of reserves as insurance against Sudden Stops, especially when
we have a floating exchange rate regime, the financial resilience of emerging market
economies during the Global Financial Crisis strongly suggests that having a high level
of reserves can help countries to deal with sharp changes in global financial conditions
in a much better way even if they are not heavily used.7
This paper is robust to the critique of other authors that challenge the validity of the
assumption of the use of international reserves as collateral because they are legally
protected against attachment by creditors under different law systems.8 However, the
idea behind the assumption that international reserves serve as an implicit collateral is
not based on any contractual arrangement but relies on the fact that there would be
strong reputational effects if the government or the private sector defaulted in the
presence of international reserves that could be used to comply with these obligations.
In fact, Aizenman (2009) and De Gregorio (2013) point out that the credibility of Brazil’s,
Mexico’s and Korea’s anti-crisis measures unveiled in the second half of 2008 was
reinforced by their massive stock of reserves.
Quantitative analysis show that the model does well in several dimensions. First, I
find that we can get international reserves holdings close to the average reserves-to-GDP
ratio in Latin American countries and these results are robust to different
5. The only exception as far as I am concerned is the model presented by Alfaro and Kanczuk (2013),
where the level of international reserves also remains high during crises. In their framework, international
reserves act as a hedge against external shocks as they increase the stabilizing effect of domestic debt.
6. Bussiere et al. (2015) state that "international reserves should be viewed as being akin to ’nuclear
weapon’ having a deterrent effect, rather than to true ’gunpowder’, to be used in intervention.". They also
conclude that the level of short-term debt is the main determinant of the level of reserves, which supports
my conclusions.
7. De Gregorio (2013) also points out the important role played by international reserves in the resilience
displayed by emerging markets economies during the Global Financial Crisis.
8. See Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009).
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parametrizations. Thus, when we consider the joint decision by a country to hold
foreign debt and international reserves, the government chooses to hold a significant
amount of reserves even if we just allow for one-period debt. This result contrasts with
those of Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009b) and Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez (2014), who
find that the optimal policy when you have only one-period debt is not to hold reserves
at all.9 Moreover, the optimal behavior during crises implies an increase of reserve
holdings before a Sudden Stop and a small reduction during it, which is coherent with
what was observed in the Global Financial Crisis. Finally, an alternative policy of
keeping reserves at a constant level equal to its average value all the time yields very
similar result to the optimal policy during sudden stops, highlighting the stabilizing role
of reserves even if Central Banks don’t use them at all, as noted by De Gregorio (2011).
These results hinge on the following mechanism: when the economy is hit by an
external shock, there is a drastic reduction on the amount of output that can be pledged
as collateral for external borrowing. On the other hand, as international reserves are very
liquid assets, their collateral value is always the same independently of the state of
global financial markets. Consequently, the government might want to keep a stock of
international reserves in case the country is hit by an external shock to smooth the
necessary deleveraging during these periods. The government then faces a trade-off
between the benefits of keeping reserves that serve as collateral for foreign borrowing in
bad times and the cost of carrying this stock of reserves. Thus, international reserves
serve as a credit line that the country can use in periods when its ability to borrow is
heavily constrained.
Related Literature. This paper lies at the intersection of different lines of literature.
First, it is related to the literature that tries to explain reserve accumulation in emerging
markets. Some authors argue that reserve accumulation has a mercantilist motive and is
related to competitiveness in international trade. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber
9. Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez (2014) find that having long-duration bonds is key to get significant
levels of debt and reserves simultaneously.
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(2004a) state this motivation specifically for China, where a strategy of export promotion
and consequently the desire of a depreciated currency leads to sizable reserve
accumulation. Moreover, international reserves could serve as collateral for FDI and all
the learning externalities that might come with investment in the tradable sector
(Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004b). To address this issue, Korinek and
Servén (2016) build a stylized model that incorporates learning-by-investment
externalities and a capital intensive tradable goods sector. They show that in their setup
the net welfare effects depend on the balance between the static losses from lower
tradable absorption and the dynamic gains from higher growth. However, their
calibrated model suggests that the welfare benefits of reserve accumulation are
outweighed by its costs for standard parameter values.
Another strand of the literature sees reserve accumulation as a form of precautionary
savings. To quantify the level of reserves that can be justified as an insurance against
capital flow volatility, Jeanne and Ranciere (2011) present a model of the optimal level of
international reserves for small open economies seeking insurance against Sudden Stops
in capital flows. They find that plausible calibrations can explain reserves of the order of
magnitude observed in many emerging countries but Emerging Asia, where one has to
assume a large anticipated output cost of Sudden Stops and a high level of risk aversion
to explain their reserves to GDP ratio. However, in their model reserves are insurance
contracts which pay off only in a sudden stop while what we see in practice is that
international reserves are composed mostly by non-contingent risk free assets. Alfaro
and Kanczuk (2009b) study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves and
find that the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all as they increase the willingness
to default of the country, which makes debt more costly. On the other hand, Salomão
(2013) shows that their result is not robust to the introduction of asymmetric default
costs as in Arellano (2008). In this case, the optimal policy is to accumulate positive
levels of debt and reserves in equilibrium. Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez (2014)
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propose a model where reserves provide insurance against future increases in the
borrowing cost when there is the possibility of sovereign default. Thus, depending on
the probability of higher borrowing cost in the future, the government may be willing to
pay the financial cost of reserve accumulation to avoid the need to rollover debt at a high
cost when faced by a Sudden Stop. Finally, extending the precautionary approach,
Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010) build a model based on the idea that reserve
accumulation is a tool for managing domestic financial instability and smoothing
exchange rate fluctuations. They argue that, in a double drain scenario, domestic capital
flight is financed through withdrawals of domestic bank deposits. In their setup, the
growth of banking systems and financial markets in emerging markets explains almost
all the recent buildup of reserve holdings.10
This paper contributes to this literature by showing that introducing international
reserves as an implicit collateral for foreign borrowing in a small open economy model
subject to exogenous financial shocks leads to optimal levels of reserves and debt to GDP
similar to what we observe in Latin America. This result is obtained in an environment
where there is only short term debt, contrary to the findings of Alfaro and Kanczuk
(2009b) and Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez (2014), who argue that in the presence
only of short term debt the optimal holdings of international reserves is zero.
The paper is also related to the literature which focus in the rate of return dominance
puzzle, ie, why low-return assets are used in reality given the availability of risk-free
assets with higher return. The most prominent strand of this literature is the one who
studies the credit card puzzle, ie, why many households have simultaneously significant
credit card debit and low return liquid assets. To explain this puzzle, Telyukova (2013)
and Telyukova and Wright (2008) present models where individuals anticipate needing
some liquidity in situations where credit cards cannot be used. My model provides in
the context of a sovereign a similar explanation for holding very liquid assets
10. Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2010) also argue that the path of reserve accumulation suggests that it
is better explained by an exchange rate smoothing policy than by a pure precautionary motive.
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(international reserves) and debt at the same time.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 illustrates the
mechanism behind my results in a simple environment. Section 2.3 builds a quantitative
business cycle model including international reserves as collateral for foreign borrowing.
Section 2.4 details the calibration and simulation of the model and presents its
unconditional moments, the behavior of different variables during crises and analyzes
the implications of an alternative policy where we keep international reserves at
constant levels for all periods. Section 2.5 evaluates the sensitivity of the results to some
specific parameters. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 A SIMPLE MODEL
I present now a simple model to provide some intuition on how the mechanism
works. The economy lasts for three periods, receives a deterministic endowment only in
the last one and might face an exogenous shock in the intermediate period that limits the
amount of borrowing to a multiple of international reserves held by the government,
which gives a motive for reserve accumulation. I present the full model in the next
section.
2.2.1 Environment
The economy lasts for three periods t = 0,1,2. There is only one good and a
representative agent receives a deterministic sequence of endowments given by
y0 = y1 = 0 and y2 > 0. The household only values consumption in periods 1 and 2 and
maximizes the discounted expected future flow of utility using a subjective discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1). Households can borrow from abroad subject to an interest rate r
exogenously determined. I assume for simplicity that β(1 + r) = 1 and the utility
function is given by u(c) = ln(c).
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The economy is subject to a "sudden stop shock" in period 1. If the sudden stop shock
materializes, borrowing in period 1 is limited to a multiple κir of international reserves
held by the government. A sudden stop occurs with probability πε[0, 1].
At t = 0, the government can accumulate reserves through lump-sum taxation on
households. The only reason to accumulate international reserves is to use them as
collateral for external borrowing if the economy is faced by the sudden-stop shock in
period 1.
Let bt+1 denote the bond purchased by agents in period t. A negative value means an
issuance of bonds by households. The budget constraints for each period for the whole
economy are given by:
IR1 ≤ −b1
c1 ≤ (1 + r)b1 − b2 + IR1




c2 ≤ y2 + b2(1 + r)
where s0 denotes a sudden stop state and s1 denotes a normal state. Figure 2.2 shows the
timing of decisions and correspondent utilities at each period for the simple model when
all budget constraints are satisfied with equality.
2.2.2 Analytical Results
A social planner maximizes the expected utility choosing the optimal level of reserves
and consumption at t = {1, 2}. If the economy is not subject to a sudden stop shock, the
solution is trivially c∗1 = c
∗
2 = y2/(2 + r). However, a sudden stop may prevent agents
from borrowing in period 1 if there aren’t any international reserves in place.
Substituting the budget constraints for different states into the utility function, the
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Figure 2.2: Timing of Decisions and Utilities - Simple Model
problem for the social planner is given by:
max
IR1,b2(s1)
π{ln[(κir− r)IR1]+ βln[y2− (1+ r)κir IR1]}+(1−π){ln[−b2(s1)− rIR1]+ βln[y2 + b2(s1)(1+ r)]}
It is clear from the social planner’s problem the costs and benefits of holding reserves:
on the one hand, there is a cost of carrying reserves from period 0 to 1, which is given by
rIR1 as the agents have to issue bonds to finance the acquisition of international
reserves; on the other hand, if the economy is hit by a sudden stop shock, it allows to
increase consumption by κir IR1 in period 1.
Taking first order conditions, the optimal level of reserves holdings is given implicitly
by the following expression:
y2 − (2 + r)kir IR1







y2 − r(1 + r)IR1
= 0
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which has as solution a linear function in y2:
IR1 = K(r, π, κir)y2
where the constants are given by11
K(r, π, κir) =
K2 − K3
K1
K1 = 2r(2 + r)(1 + r)κir




and has the following properties
1. IR1 is strictly increasing in π
2. IR1 is strictly decreasing in r
3. IR1 is strictly decreasing in κir
4. IR1 is strictly increasing in y2 as Kε(0, 1/2]
Consequently, if the probability of a sudden stop is high, the optimal level of reserves
is also higher as an insurance against it. Moreover, if the opportunity cost of holding
reserves is high, the optimal reserves holdings are lower. Additionally, if the collateral
value of reserves is high, the optimal holdings are also lower as we need less reserves to
get the same foreign borrowing level. Finally, if output is higher in the future, it pays off
to carry more reserves as an insurance against the bad state.
In the next section, I present a detailed model that will allow me to evaluate the
quantitative implications of the role of reserves as collateral to account for the level of
reserve holdings in emerging markets and their behavior during crises.
11. K(r, π, κir) = (K2 + K3)/K1 violates the feasibility conditions in the economy as it greater than 1 so
we have as unique solution K(r, π, κir) = (K2 − K3)/K1.
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2.3 A QUANTITATIVE BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL WITH
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AS COLLATERAL
This section presents a small open endowment economy where foreign creditors
constraint the amount that they lend to a share of tradable output and a multiple of the
international reserves held by the government. In this setting, the main purpose of
reserves is to facilitate external borrowing when the economy is hit by an exogenous
shock that drastically reduces the amount of output that can be pledged as collateral.
This way, the government faces a trade-off between the benefits of keeping reserves that
serve as collateral for foreign borrowing in bad times and the cost of carrying this stock
of reserves, as we saw in the simple model of Section 2.2. After detailing the model, I
present both the competitive equilibrium and the socially optimal one.
2.3.1 Theoretical Framework
I model a small open endowment economy where the preferences of the









where β ∈ (0, 1) is a subjective discount factor.
The consumption basket is a CES aggregator with elasticity of substitution η between
tradable cTt and nontradable goods c
N
t :
ct ≡ A(cTt , cNt ) = [ω(cTt )−η + (1−ω)(cNt )−η]
− 1η
Every period, consumers receive an endowment of traded yTt and nontraded y
N
t
goods. Markets of contingent claims are incomplete so consumers can only trade
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one-period bonds on international capital markets.12 The face value of these bonds
specifies the amount that will be paid in the next period, bt+1. I normalize the price of
tradables to 1 and define the relative price of nontradables as pN. I also assume that the
Government accumulates reserves through lump-sum taxation τt. The households’











t + (1 + r)bt (2.2)
and as the Government only taxes agents to accumulate international reserves and
runs a balanced budget, its budget constraint is given by
τt+1 = ∆IRt+1 (2.3)
The central assumption of the model is that creditors constraint the amount that they
lend to a fraction κTt of tradable income plus κ
ir times the total stock of international
reserves:
bt+1 ≥ −[κTt yTt + κir IRt] (2.4)
where κTt is an exogenous parameter that represents the state of international financial
markets. I assume that κTt can take two different values, κ
T,H, which is related to normal
times, and κT,L, which is related to disruptions in financial markets, capturing the feature
that extreme capital flows episodes are significantly related to global risk, as we can see
for example in Calvo (2005) and Forbes and Warnock (2012).13 The level of international
12. I limit my analysis to short-term debt instead of long term debt as in Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez
(2014) based on the results of Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2013). They argue that the predominance
of short-term debt in developing countries happens because investors charge a higher risk-premium on
long-term bonds and this relative cost increases even more on crisis, making it much cheaper for emerging
markets to borrow short-term. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009a) also show that the optimal structure for Emerg-
ing Markets is usually to have only short-term debt, although in their model this arises from the fact that
the costs of defaulting increase more than its benefits when maturity increases.
13. Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) also have a model where views about safe levels of leverage change
abruptly over time, an event they call a Wile E. Coyote moment based on the famous Road Runner cartoon.
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reserves is taken as given from the perspective of the households. We can think as this
borrowing limit being the result of an incentive constraint coming from information
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and underdeveloped financial markets,
which leads to limited enforcement. For simplicity, I assume it as exogenously given.
The possibility of using international reserves as collateral has been challenged by
different authors such as Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009b). However, although central bank
assets are legally protected against attachment by creditors under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 of the USA and comparable laws, the argument for the inclusion
of international reserves as collateral relies on the reputational costs of a default in
external borrowing by the government or the private sector in the presence of
international reserves that could be used to fulfill these obligations. In practice, we
usually see a positive correlation between the stocks of international reserves and
short-term foreign debt. Dominguez, Hashimoto, and Ito (2012), for example, find that
countries that accumulated larger stocks of reserves prior to the Global Financial Crisis
also had higher short-term debt to GDP ratios. I will show later that this is also the case
for the crises episodes that I study in this paper.
2.3.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Households choose {cTt , cNt , bt+1}t≥0 to maximize expected utility (1) subject to the
budget constraint (2) and the borrowing limit (4), taking b0, pNt , τt+1 and IRt as given.
Defining G(cTt , c
N
t ) ≡ U′(ct)A1(cTt , cNt ), the first-order conditions are:
G(cTt , c
N










λt = β(1 + r)Etλt+1 + µt (2.7)
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µt ≥ 0, µt[bt+1 + κTt yTt + κir IRt] = 0 (2.8)




τt+1 = ∆IRt+1 (2.10)
Definition 1 (Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium): A competitive equilibrium is
a set of processess {cTt , bt+1, µt}t≥0 satisfying:
G(cTt , y
N




t+1) + µt (2.11)









µt ≥ 0, µt
[






given processes {yTt , yNt , IRt}t≥0 and the initial condition b−1.
2.3.3 Socially Optimal Equilibrium
So far I just stated that households solve their optimization problem taking the stock
of international reserves as exogenously given. To determine the optimal amount of
international reserves at each period t, I write the optimization problem in recursive
form and solve the social planner’s problem. The social planner’s problem consists in




t } to maximize expected utility subject to
the budget constraint and the collateral constraint:
V(IR, b, y) = max
IR′,b′,cT




cT + b′ + IR′ = yT + b(1 + r) + IR
b′ ≥ −(κTyTt + κir IR)
The first order conditions associated with this problem are now:
G(cTt , y
N




t+1) + µt (2.15)
G(cTt , y
N
t ) = βEt{G(cTt+1, yNt+1) + µt+1κir} (2.16)
µt ≥ 0, µt
[






Notice that the competitive equilibrium and the socially optimal one have the same
Euler Equation and differ only because now the planner also chooses optimally the level
of international reserves through equation (2.16). Thus, to implement the Social
Planner’s equilibrium as a competitive equilibrium the planner chooses the optimal
IRt+1 given current conditions and then finance it through lump-sum taxation of the
households making τt+1 = ∆IRt+1.
2.4 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
This section calibrates and simulates the model, showing that it can yield
international reserves to GDP ratios close to what we see in practice. I also get that the
cyclical behavior of the current account and external debt is very close to what we
observe in practice, while that of international reserves is somewhat different. Moreover,
the optimal policy leads to reserve accumulation before a Sudden Stop and a small
depletion during it, which is close to what we see in the annual data. Finally, I evaluate
the behavior of the model under a simpler passive rule for reserve accumulation where
the Central Bank keeps international reserves levels constant all the time and find that
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the behavior of consumption in crises under the passive rule is very similar to what we
is obtained under the optimal policy.
2.4.1 Long-Run Business Cycle Moments in the Data
I begin the analysis by looking at the main statistics regarding international reserves,
net foreign liabilities ex-international reserves and current account balance for the larger
Latin American Countries, shown in Table 2.1. As we can see, the average ratio of
international reserves to GDP is close to 10% while that of net foreign liabilities
ex-international reserves is around 37%. Moreover, international reserves are acyclical
while the other variables are countercyclical.
2012 Average Std Autocorr. Correl(y)
International Reserves 12.2% 9.7% 3.0% 0.39 0.02
Net Foreign Liabilities ex-IR 31.8% 36.7% 13.5% 0.66 -0.40
Current Account -2.0% -1.4% 2.6% 0.68 -0.38
Note: The data are the simple average of the indicators for the five main Latin American countries (Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico). To calculate the standard deviations and correlations, I
detrend the log of Real GDP, International Reserves to GDP and Net Foreign Liabilities ex-International
Reserves to GDP ratios taking out a linear and a quadratic trend. Current Account to GDP ratio is not de-
trended as it is stationary. The data are from the World Development Indicators database from the World
Bank and the updated and extended version of the dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
The data are sampled annually from 1991:2012.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics - Latin America (% of GDP)
2.4.2 Sudden Stops Episodes
Following Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2008) and Alberola, Erce, and Serena (2016), I
focus on Systemic Sudden Stops, ie, episodes triggered by an exogenous financial
shock.14 I use the JP Morgan EMBI Global Index to identify periods of global financial
stress in Emerging Markets. These periods are defined as quarters where there is a spike
14. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2008) argue that focusing on Systemic Sudden Stops is desirable because
they exclude idiosyncratic crises that can result from factors such as political turmoil and disasters. These
idiosyncratic crises have several different features compared to the ones I isolate here.
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in the EMBI Global spread with respect to its 2 year moving average. This way, I have
four global financial stress events: 1995, 1999, 2002 and 2009, which are the well known
Tequila, Russian-Asian, Argentinean and Global Financial Crises. Using these global
crises dates we can then identify the Sudden Stops episodes, which are those dates
where the country experiences a one standard deviation reversal in the current account
conditional on being in a global crisis year. The methodology yields eight Sudden Stops
episodes for the five Latin American countries studied in this paper. The list of episodes
can be seen in Table 2.2.






Table 2.2: Sudden Stops Episodes
Figure 2.3 shows the average behavior of the ratio of current account, international
reserves and net foreign liabilities ex-international reserves to GDP in crises. The
behavior of this variables is close to what was obtained in previous works by
Eichengreen, Gupta, and Mody (2008) and Jeanne (2007). Both international reserves and
net foreign liabilities ex-international reserves to GDP ratios increase in the onset of a
Sudden Stop episode and decrease after that. The real exchange rate appreciates before
the Sudden Stop, suffers a strong depreciation during it and stays at this more
depreciated value after that.
2.4.3 Functional Forms and Calibration





Figure 2.3: Macro Dynamics around Sudden Stops Events
Note: The five year window is centered around a Sudden Stop occurring at time t. The list of countries and
Sudden Stops is given in Table 2.2. All variables are expressed in percentage points of GDP except for the
Real Exchange Rate.
Source: Authors’ computations based on World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database.
The endowment process follows a VAR(1):
log(yt) = ρlog(yt−1) + εt
with |ρ| < 1 and εt ∼ N(0, V). I use an average of the process estimated for










I discretize the process into a first-order Markov process with 4 grid points for each
shock using Terry and Knotek (2011) methods’, which allows for arbitrary error
covariance structures.15
κTt can take two values, κ
T,H, which is related to normal times, and κT,L, which is
related to disruptions in international financial markets. The probability of entering a
period of disruptions in international financial markets is given by π while the
probability of going back to normal times by ψ.
All the benchmark parameter values can be seen in Table 2.3. A period in the model
refers to a year.
Parameter Value Source/target
Interest rate r = 0.04 Standard value
Risk aversion σ = 2 Standard value
Atemporal elasticity of substitution 1/(1 + η) = 0.8 Conservative value
Weight on tradables in CES ω = 0.23 Share of tradable output = 23%
Discount factor β = 0.93 Average NFL ex IR-GDP ratio = 36.7%
Probability of entering financial distress π = 0.2 CA reversal = 2.9%
Probability of going back to normal times ψ = 0.4 CA recovery = 0.9%
yT credit coefficient in financial distress κT,L = 0.7 CA standard deviation = 2.6%
IR credit coefficient κir = 2.06 Frequency of Sudden Stops = 8.0%
Table 2.3: Calibrated Parameter Values
The interest rate r is set to 4% and the coefficient of risk aversion is set to 2, which are
standard values in quantitative business cycles analysis for emerging markets. The
range of estimates for the atemporal elasticity of substitution 1/(1 + η) is between 0.40
and 0.83, as we can see in Mendoza (2005), so I use 0.8 as a conservative value. The
parameter ω defines the share of tradable in the CES aggregator and is defined such that
we have 23% share of tradable production, which is the average for the Latin American
Countries in my sample.
The subjective discount factor β is set to match the average net foreign liabilities
15. I would like to thank Ed Knotek for providing the code to implement this method.
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ex-international reserves to GDP ratio for LAC, which is 36.7% for the period 1991-2012.
This criteria yields a beta of 0.93, which is reasonable for annual frequency.
I calibrate κT,H such that the collateral constraint is never binding in normal times.16
The parameters concerning the behavior of international financial markets disruptions
are κT,L, the credit coefficient for tradable output in financial distress periods, π, the
probability of entering a financial distress period, and ψ, the probability of going back to
normal times. They are set to get a current account standard deviation around 2.6%, a
current account reversal of close to 2.9% of GDP in the year of a Sudden Stop (compared
to average of the previous 3 years) and a posterior reduction in the current account result
of 0.9% (compared to the average of the 3 years after the sudden stop), which were
obtained from the data analysis shown before. This yields κT,L equal to 0.7, π equal to
0.2 and ψ equal to 0.4. The parameters values obtained for π and ψ are consistent with
what is observed in the sample, as we have four international crises in 22 years and they
usually last for two years.
Finally, I obtain κir by matching the frequency of Sudden Stops for my sample of
countries. I obtain κir equal to 2.06, which seems reasonable because, as noted by Siritto
(2016), the collateral solves an asymmetric information problem about the resources
available to the borrower at the time of repayment, creating incentives to tell the truth
and allowing agents to borrow more funds than by just selling the assets.17 I will show
later that choosing a wide range of values for κir leads to average levels of international
reserves close to the baseline scenario if we adjust the subjective discount factor β
accordingly to get always the same average net foreign liabilities ex-international
reserves, changing mainly the frequency of sudden stops.
16. As κT,H is very high, the lower bound of bond holdings becomes bmin > −
yTmin
r , which is the largest
debt that the country can repay.
17. García-Schmidt (2015) include asymmetric information in a model of sovereign borrowing with de-
fault and finds that it improves a lot the fit for debt and spreads, which indicates that this is an important
feature of emerging markets debt markets.
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2.4.4 Borrowing and International Reserves Decisions
Figure 2.4 shows the bond decision rules for both κT,H, which I call normal period,
and κT,L, which I call crisis period. Since the average value of tradable output is equal to
1, we can interpret the results as ratios of the average level of tradable output. As we can
see, for the same level of current bond holdings, agents decide to have more debt in t+1
the lower is the tradable output during periods when the collateral constraint is not
binding. However, when it is binding agents are restricted to a level of debt around 1.5
times tradable output.
Figure 2.4: Bond Policy Functions
Note: The bond policy functions are calculated for IRt = 0.35, which is the average stock of international
reserves in tradable units.
Figure 2.5 shows the international reserves decision rules again for both normal and
crisis periods. As we can see, the decision of international reserves holdings depends
crucially on whether we are in normal or crisis times. In normal times, the higher the
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current debt, the more international reserves are accumulated as we are in a more
dangerous zone, closer to a binding collateral constraint if international finance
conditions turn out to be bad in the following period. During crises, there is a tradeoff
between reducing international reserves to consume more today and keeping the
reserves in case the crises lasts for more periods in the future. Thus, reserves holdings
are kept somewhat around the current level when the collateral constraint is binding and
debt levels are not too high as an additional insurance if the crisis continues. On the
other hand, there is some reduction in international reserves holdings when current debt
is really high to compensate for the strong deleveraging necessary in the current period
due to the binding constraint.
Figure 2.5: International Reserves Policy Functions
Note: The international reserves policy functions are calculated for IRt = 0.35, which is the average stock
of international reserves in tradable units.
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2.4.5 Long-Run Business Cycle Moments in the Model
In this section, I compare the model unconditional moments to the data. To do that, I
conduct a one million periods simulation of the model by drawing a sequence of
endowments {yTt , yNt } and tradable output credit constraint coefficient {κTt } from their




Table 2.4 shows that in general I am able to reproduce the main moments in the data.
First, I manage to get an average reserves-to-GDP ratio very close to the data. Second, I
get countercyclical fluctuations for the current account and net foreign liabilities
ex-international reserves and procyclical fluctuations for the real exchange rate, again
with results very close to the data.18 However, I also get countercyclical reserves, which
is at odds with what we see in practice, where they are almost acyclical. Finally, the
standard deviation of both international reserves and net foreign liabilities
ex-international reserves are higher than what we see in the data.
Targeted Moments Model Data
Average NFL ex-Reserves-to-GDP 36.6% 36.7%




Non-Targeted Moments Model Data
Average Reserves-to-GDP 8.2% 9.7%
σ(IR/Y) 9.8% 3.0%





Table 2.4: Long-Run Business Cycle Moments
The high standard deviation of international reserves and net foreign liabilities
18. I use the relative price of nontradables as a measure of the real exchange rate in the model.
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ex-international reserves might be explained by the absence of any adjustment costs for
agents to adjust their foreign assets positions, as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) for
example. The presence of convex portfolio adjustment costs would curb the volatility of
both international reserves and net foreign liabilities ex-international reserves, which
might lead to numbers closer to the data. It could also solve the issue of the
countercyclicality of international reserves, as the government would accumulate more
reserves during good times to avoid paying high adjustment costs when it gets closer to
a binding collateral constraint. As this was not the main subject of this paper, I decided
not to include any adjustment costs.
2.4.6 Sudden Stops Experiments
I now analyze the dynamics of the model during a Sudden Stop and compare it with
the data. To construct the implied Sudden Stop events by the model, I do the following
steps:
1. Identify crisis events: I define t as a crisis event when we get a current account
reversion of 1 standard deviation and a binding collateral constraint;
2. Compute averages of macro quantities of the model centered around these events,
were t represents the crisis episode;
3. Compare the outcomes with the average crisis in the data.
As we can see in Figure 2.6, the model can explain the behavior of macroeconomic
variables in Sudden Stops with some minor caveats. First, the optimal policy implies
that the economy enters the crisis with a higher level of international reserves than what
we see in the data. Moreover, international reserves have a small depletion after the
onset of a crisis both in the model and in the data. Second, the optimal policy is to keep
international reserves somewhat stable after a Sudden Stop and consequently the model
cannot explain the rebuilding of international reserves levels after crises that we see in
practice. Finally, the behavior of net foreign liabilities ex-international reserves to GDP
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ratio is close to what we see in the data, although we get a higher and more stable level
before the crisis in the model.
Figure 2.6: Macro Dynamics around Sudden Stops Events
2.4.7 A Simpler Rule - The Passive Central Banker
I now compare the optimal police with a passive Central Banker who just keeps the
level of international reserves constant at the average level in tradable goods units in the
base scenario for all periods, regardless the state of the economy. The behavior of
different variables can be seen in Figure 2.7. The economy with constant international
reserves enters the Sudden Stop with a lower level of debt but also has to deleverage as
we enter the crises with a lower level of international reserves than in the optimal policy.
Moreover, the implied path of tradable consumption is almost the same for both
economies. This implies that the welfare benefits of holding reserves during Sudden
Stops are quite similar if the Central Bank behaves optimally accumulating more
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reserves before Sudden Stops and depleting some of them during it or if he just keeps a
constant buffer that allows agents to keep their level of external borrowing. This can
explain the fear of losing reserves identified by Aizenman and Sun (2012) during the
Global Financial Crisis and is coherent with what De Gregorio (2011) pointed out:
"Countries hoard reserves because they see them as a safety net for
periods of financial stress but, in practice, they seldom use them (...) reserves
play a stabilizing role simply because they are there and not necessarily to be
used."
Figure 2.7: Macro Dynamics around Sudden Stops Events - Alternative Policy
However, this passive policy increases the frequency of sudden stops and reduces
welfare when we are far away from hitting the collateral constraint, where we would like
to reduce the level of international reserves to consume more. Moreover, when we are in
states where the collateral constraint might bind in the near future, the optimal policy is
to hold a level of international reserves higher than the average to allow for more
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consumption if the economy is hit by a negative shock in international financial markets.
2.4.8 The High Frequency Behavior of International Reserves
Although we do not see much reserve depletion during crisis on an annual basis,
there might be larger IR losses if we look at higher frequencies.19 Aizenman and Sun
(2012), for example, show that most EMs began exhibiting large IR losses during the
second half of 2008 and regained most of their losses by the first quarter of 2009. If we
look at quarterly data, there is indeed a larger IR depletion also in my sample, as we can
see in Figure 2.8, where the average reserves level falls around 15% in US dollars.
However, this fall is compensated by the fall in GDP in US dollars due to currency
depreciation and recessions experienced by some countries and, consequently, we still
get on average an increase in the ratio of international reserves to GDP, coherent with
their annual counterpart. Moreover, although it is true that we see some cases of
stronger reserve depletion, as in Argentina in the 2002 crisis, these episodes are related
to fixed exchange rate regimes, which are not the subject of this paper, where I abstract
from studying the effects of different exchange rate policies on reserve accumulation.
Finally, the fact that countries reserves holdings start to recover rapidly is another
evidence that although they might be used for another purpose in the short term, their
role as collateral leads to an urgency of having them back quickly to the previous levels.
2.4.9 Do International Reserves Serve as Collateral?
Until now I have assumed that international reserves are used as collateral, is this
really the case? Unfortunately, as the main idea is that reserves serve as an implicit
collateral, we cannot infer directly from any database if this is true. However, an
implication of my setup is that during periods of international financial stress countries
with a higher level of international reserves before these crisis are able to hold more debt
19. I thank Pablo Ottonello for pointing out this fact.
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Figure 2.8: International Reserves around Sudden Stops - Quarterly Data
during the crises. I check this implication for several emerging economies, the results are
presented in Figure 2.9. As we can see, there is a strong positive correlation between bt+1
and IRt and thus it indicates that foreign lenders do lend more during crisis to countries
that have a higher level of international reserves.
2.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section, I show the sensitivity of my results to the choice of parameters. First, I
evaluate alternative values for the coefficient of international reserves in the collateral
constraint. Some people might think that the model can explain any level of
international reserves by changing κir but I show that if we adjust the subjective discount
factor β to get always the same average net foreign liabilities ex-international reserves,
the model yields very similar results for any value of this coefficient. After that, I also
change the values of the probability of entering a crisis, π, the probability of going back
to normal times, ψ, the collateral constraint coefficient during financial distress, κT,L, and
the atemporal elasticity of substitution, implied by η, adjusting the subjective discount
factor β accordingly to get the same average level of net foreign liabilities
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Figure 2.9: Net Foreign Liabilities ex-International Reserves and International Reserves in International Crisis
Note: Each point represents data for a specific country during an international crisis episode. The years of
international financial stress are 1995, 1999, 2002 and 2009. The value of international reserves is measured
in the beginning of the year of an international financial stress period while that of net foreign liabilities
ex-international reserves is measured in the beginning of the following year. The countries included are
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and
Uruguay.
Source: Authors’ computations based on the updated and extended version of the dataset constructed by
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
ex-international reserves. Again, the results are not very sensitive to these changes and I
get similar results to the baseline scenario.
2.5.1 Can the Model Explain Any Level of International Reserves if I
change κir?
I now analyze what would happen with the results if I change the value of κir and
adjust the subjective discount factor β accordingly to get the same average level of net
foreign liabilities ex-international reserves. As we can see in Figure 2.10, average reserve
holdings are quite similar for all values of κir, ranging from 7.4% to 9.4% of GDP. In fact,
changing κir mainly changes the frequency of sudden stops, which confirms the choice
of this variable to calibrate the parameter.20 This result shows that, contrary to what
some people might suspect, the model cannot tautologically generate any level of
20. The frequency of sudden stops goes from 13.6% for κir equal to 1.0 to 4.7% for κir equal to 2.6.
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international reserves just by changing the value of κir.
Figure 2.10: International Reserves - Sensitivity to κir
2.5.2 Sensitivity to Other Parameters
After analyzing the sensitivity of my results to the choice of κir, I do the same for the
other parameters of the model. Figures 2.11-2.16 show the model’s behavior during
crises when I change the collateral constraint coefficient in financial distress, κT,L, the
probability of going back to normal times, ψ, the probability of entering a crisis, π, and
the atemporal elasticity of substitution, implied by η, compared to the baseline scenario.
As we can see, the results are very close to what I get in the baseline scenario, which
confirms the robustness of the results. However, some differences are worth noting.
First, lowering κT,L mainly increases the level of international reserves held during crises
to compensate for the lower pledgeability of tradable output as collateral. Second,
changing ψ affects mainly the use of reserves during crises. If the probability of exiting
the crises is higher, the optimal policy is to use more reserves to reduce consumption less
today. Finally, changing π affects the level of reserves and foreign liabilities during
crises. A higher probability of entering a crises leads to a higher level of reserves and
foreign liabilities in a similar magnitude.
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Figure 2.11: Macro Dynamics around Sudden Stops Events - Lower κT,L
Figure 2.12: Macro Dynamics around Sudden Stops Events - Higher ψ
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Figure 2.13: Macro Dynamics around Sudden Stops Events - Lower ψ
Figure 2.14: Macro Dynamics around Sudden Stops Events - Higher π
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Figure 2.15: Macro Dynamics around Sudden Stops Events - Lower π
Figure 2.16: Macro Dynamics around Sudden Stops Events - Lower ES
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2.6 CONCLUSION
Why emerging markets hold very high levels of international reserves and short-term
foreign liabilities simultaneously? This work explains this puzzling fact by explicitly
introducing international reserves as collateral for external borrowing in a dynamic,
stochastic model of a small open economy with credit constraints subject to exogenous
financial shocks.
I find that the model can explain the observed average level of reserves to GDP ratio
in Latin America without considering any additional motives for reserve accumulation.
Moreover, the optimal policy implies that the government accumulates reserves before a
Sudden Stop and there is a small depletion during it. Finally, the welfare implications of
the optimal policy are quite similar to those of a policy of constant international reserves,
which sheds some light on the fear of losing reserves observed in the recent Global
Financial Crisis.
It is important to emphasize that I abstract from some potentially important features
of models where foreign liabilities and international reserves are chosen together. First, I
don’t consider the role of international reserves to reduce output costs in Sudden Stops.
Including this feature would unambiguously lead to an increase in the optimal level of
reserves. Second, I don’t consider the possibility of sovereign default. On the one hand,
Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009b) show that holding international reserves increase the
country’s willingness to default and consequently make external debt more costly. On
the other hand, Levy Yeyati (2008) argues that international reserves reduce the
probability of default during crises and consequently reduce spreads in external
borrowing. Therefore, the effect of reserve accumulation in the cost of external
borrowing when we allow for sovereign default is still debatable. Finally, I abstract from
any exchange rate management policies, which might be another important motive for
reserve accumulation.
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The role of international reserves as collateral for foreign borrowing is an important
and not explored aspect in the recent process of international reserves accumulation by
emerging economies, which is still a puzzle in the international economics literature.
The policy implications of this feature and its potential consequences for the policies
pursued by Multilateral Institutions such as the IMF and Central Banks around the
world make it an important area for future research.
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Chapter 3




Since the onset of the Latin American crisis of the late 1990s, there has been a renewed
support for the use of capital controls in periods of capital bonanza. Even the IMF,
formerly known to support capital account liberalization, has recently emphasized that
controls on capital inflows should be considered as part of the Emerging Economies
policy toolkit (Ostry et al. (2011)). However, most of the papers that conclude that the
imposition of taxes in capital inflows might be optimal find small welfare gains and do
not explicitly consider capital accumulation decisions (see for example Bianchi (2011)).
The primary goal of our paper is to empirically evaluate the effects of capital controls
on fixed investment using both macro and micro data. We evaluate the effects of several
capital controls measures implemented by the Brazilian Government since 2009. We
focus on Brazil because it is the most prominent case of countercyclical capital controls.1
Moreover, financial markets in Brazil are liquid, well developed, and open to foreign
capital flows, leading to a clearer connection between the controls and the real economy.
To formally study the effects of these measures, we first follow the methodology of
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). We use a combination of other countries with similar
characteristics to Brazil to construct a synthetic control country. The control country is
calibrated to match Brazilian macroeconomic data before the imposition of controls. With
that in hand, we can then construct a counterfactual that will be compared to the actual
data to evaluate the impact of the measures on real activity.2 We find that capital controls
had negative effects on both investment and consumption in Brazil, with the former
1. Fernández, Rebucci, and Uribe (2015) examine the behavior of capital controls in a large number of
countries over the period 1995-2011 and find they are remarkably acyclical and that the Brazilian case is an
unusual one, as on average countries did not did not appeal to capital control measures to counteract the
capital inflows on the pre-great-contraction period.
2. Jinjarak, Noy, and Zheng (2013) use the same methodology to evaluate the effects of Brazilian Capital
Controls throughout 2008-11 but they focus solely on the impact on equity flows and on the exchange rate
in the short-run. Carrasco, De Mello, and Duarte (2014) also use this methodology applied to Brazilian data
but they focus on the period between 2003-12 to evaluate the performance of the Brazilian economy among
different dimensions.
80
being close to 20% higher, and the latter being 12% higher in the synthetic country. We
found no significant real effects on exports and imports.
To confirm these results at a microlevel and identify the types of firms more affected
by the controls, we then use the Worldscope database on almost 300 Brazilian firms. We
take a reduced form approach to see what the effects of capital controls on investment
were at the firm level. We supplement the data available on Worldscope with data from
the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to check the degree to which different firms
took advantage of subsidized loans from the BNDES to counteract this credit supply
shock. We also use export data to evaluate whether firms that export more benefited
from the imposition of capital controls in any particular way. What we find, robust to a
host of different specifications, is that investment over assets unambiguously declined
by as much as 40% after the imposition of capital controls. Further we find that firms
that had access to cheaper credit from the BNDES were able to offset that decline almost
completely.
We are additionally able to use the results from the first section as a novel control. We
would like to run the regressions on the micro data while controlling for macroeconomic
shocks or circumstances that would have impacted Brazil apart from capital controls. In
fact, we can do exactly that by using the synthetic levels of investment as calculated by
the synthetic control method. This captures any patterns in investment that would have
affected all commodity producing/exporting nations that did not impose any controls
during this period.
Separating the sample into classes, we find that the results are not sensitive to the size
of the firm: in percentage terms, it appears that firms were relatively equally affected. If
we then split the sample into groups based on how much firms export, we find that
firms that export more were relatively unaffected by the capital controls - their
investment did not decline significantly, nor did they BNDES loans help them
significantly. However, firms that did not export very much were significantly affected
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by both. This points to the capital controls having a very targeted goal: to support
exporters, potentially at the expense of other firms. Brazil, at the time, was concerned
with a rapidly appreciating exchange rate, which would have hurt exports - by imposing
controls, Brazil avoided this problem, but the resultant investment drop was big enough
to lead to an overall contraction. Moreover, helping exporters did not lead to higher
export volumes as we can see from the results in the macro section.
The combination of these analyses, with aggregate macro and disaggregated micro
data, lead us to conclude that the capital control policies enacted by Brazil did not have
uniformly positive effects. There may have been some benefits in stabilizing the
exchange rate and price level, which has been measured in other works. However, our
work is, as far as we know, one of the few to examine the effects of such controls on real
variables such as consumption and investment, and we find that the effects are strongly
negative, and asymmetric. This should call for a reexamination of such policies, where
modeling accounts not only for the price effects but also the investment effects to gauge
the overall welfare impact of such policies.
Related Literature. This paper is related to a recent theoretical literature that
advocates that controls on capital flows and, more broadly, macroprudential measures
might be desirable in some contexts (Ostry et al. (2011), Bianchi (2011), Korinek (2011),
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2015a), Farhi and Werning (2012), Costinot, Lorenzoni, and
Werning (2014) and many others) to curb what are called ’excessive’ capital flows. This
literature is based on the notion that there are externalities associated with external
borrowing because individual market participants do not internalize their contribution
to aggregate financial instability and ’overborrowing’ in a foreign currency might arise.
Thus prudential capital controls - tightening of restrictions on net capital inflows during
booms and their relaxation during recessions - might be desirable to induce private
agents to internalize this externality, and improve total welfare. This is not a new idea, as
it goes back to Tobin (1978) seminal paper. However, most of this literature abstracts
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from the effects on investment and its impact on welfare. Our paper tries to fill this gap
by giving an estimate of the potential effects on investment that might help to complete
an evaluation of its welfare effects.
It is also related to papers that analyze the effectiveness of capital controls. Magud,
Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011) provide a thorough survey of this literature and find that
capital controls on inflows seem to make monetary policy more independent, alter the
composition of capital flows, and reduce real exchange rate pressures. Klein (2012)
differentiates among episodic and long-standing capital controls and finds that only the
latter have some effect on growth of certain financial variables and with GDP growth.
However, he also points out that these differences seem to arise from the fact that
countries with long-standing controls on capital inflows are also poorer than the other
countries in the sample. Andreasen, Schindler, and Valenzuela (2015) study the effects of
capital controls on corporate bond spreads and find that restrictions on capital inflows
produce a substantial and economically meaningful increase on them, which supports
our results regarding real investment. Finally, Forbes (2007) finds that the Chilean capital
controls during the 90’s increased financial constraints, especially for smaller traded
firms. Our paper contributes to this strand of the literature by focusing on real variables
and finds that there were significant real effects of controls, which is at odds with most
of the previous literature.
Finally, there are some other papers that also study the particular case of Brazil after
the Global Financial Crisis. Chamon and Garcia (2016) document that the capital
controls measures in Brazil had some success in segmenting Brazilian and global
financial markets, but they do not find significant effects in the exchange rate. Jinjarak,
Noy, and Zheng (2013) also employ a synthetic control methodology but they focus
mainly on the effects on capital inflows and were not able to find any significant effect.
Finally, Alfaro, Chari, and Kanczuk (2016) examine the effects of these measures on
firm-level stock returns and real investment and find a significant drop in cumulative
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abnormal returns for Brazilian firms following capital control announcements, with
large firms and largest exporting firms appearing to be less affected. They do not find
any statistically significant change in investment for the whole sample but, when they
split the sample, they find that there was a significant fall in investment for small and
non-exporting firms while exporting firms saw a statistically significant rise in their
investment rates. Although they also focus on firm-level investment, they employ an
event-study methodology which do not control for changes in investment opportunities
or the huge increase in provision of subsidized credit. Our contribution is to show that,
even controlling for all these facts there still was a significant decline in firm investment
after the imposition of controls.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a quick
view of capital controls measures in Brazil to contextualize this work. Section 3.3
describes the macroeconomic approach and its results. Section 3.4 describes the
microeconomic approach and its results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 A LOOK AT THE BRAZILIAN CASE
Brazil has a long history of capital controls measures. In the 1990s, a wave of current
account liberalization started. Minella and Goldfajn (2007) state that
The liberalization was a gradual process of establishing new rules on capital
inflows and outflows. The result of the liberalization process was (a)
reduction or elimination of taxes on foreign capital financial transactions and
of minimum maturity requirements on loans; (b) elimination of quantitative
restrictions on investments by nonresidents in financial and capital markets
securities issued either domestically or abroad; (c) permission for residents to
issue securities abroad, including debt, without prior approval by the Central
Bank; (d) more freedom for residents to invest in FDI and portfolio abroad;
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and finally (e) the introduction of currency convertibility, initially through the
mechanism of international transfers in Reais, whereby residents could
transfer their resources abroad through the use of nonresident accounts.
This period of a more open capital account came to an end in 2008 due to massive
foreign inflows. After some short-lived controls in the beginning of 2008, the Brazilian
Government imposed a long list of measures beginning in October 2009 due to the
unprecedented measures of unconventional monetary policy taken by advanced
economies policy makers after the Global Financial Crisis, which were labeled later by
Brazilian President Rousseff as a "monetary tsunami that have led to a currency war and
have introduced new and perverse forms of protectionism in the world". These
measures are the focus of this paper and are described in detail in Table 3.1.3
Date Capital Control Measures
10/19/09 2% tax on portfolio inflows (equity & fixed income)
11/18/09 1.5% tax on the conversion of ADRs into local equities
10/04/10 Tax on fixed income inflows raised to 4% tax
10/18/10 Tax on fixed income inflows raised to 6% tax
01/06/11 Unremunerated reserve requirement on bank FX positions > US$ 3 billions
03/28/11 6% entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 1 year
04/06/11 6% entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 2 years
07/08/11 Unremunerated reserve requirement on bank FX positions > US$ 1 billion
07/26/11 1% tax on long notional Brazilian Real derivatives positions
12/01/11 Elimination of tax on portfolio equity inflows
02/29/12 6% entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 3 years
03/01/12 Restrictions on anticipation of exporter payments for up to 1 year
03/09/12 6% entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 5 years
03/15/12 Tax on derivatives set to zero for hedging by exporters
06/13/12 6% entry tax on foreign loans restricted to maturities below 2 years
12/04/12 Anticipation of exporter payments for up to 5 years are allowed
12/05/12 6% entry tax on foreign loans restricted to maturities below 1 year
06/04/13 Elimination of tax on fixed income flows
Source: Adapted from Chamon and Garcia (2016).
Table 3.1: Capital Controls Measures in Brazil - 2009-2012
As noted by Chamon and Garcia (2016), these measures were successful in
3. We did not start our analysis in 2008 because the measures at that time were in place for a very brief
period due to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Moreover, it would be hard to disentangle the effects of
the controls from those of the Global Financial Crisis.
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Figure 3.1: 90-Day Cupom Cambial (Spread Between Onshore and Offshore Dollar Rates - %)
Note: Red squares are a tightening in capital controls and green circles are a loosening in capital controls.
Source: Bloomberg.
segmenting the Brazilian and global financial markets. Figure 3.1 shows the spread
between onshore and offshore dollar rates. The spreads had been relatively small,
around 1%, but had a huge increase after the October 2010 measures, coming back to
previous levels only after the loosening measures of early 2012. Moreover, as we can see
in Figure 3.2, after the October 2010 measures portfolio inflows also declined sharply
while foreign direct investments actually increased and other investments were not
affected.4
There seems also to exist a close relation between the capital controls measures and a
strong slowdown in GDP growth and investment (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4). The
slowdown occurred both in capital goods production and, to a lesser extent, in capital
goods imports, which might indicate that the effect of controls were more pronounced in
the financing of capital goods purchases and not only on the financing of imports
themselves (see Figure 3.5).
Given all this preliminary evidence, we proceed in the next sections to evaluate more
4. The increase in foreign direct investments might be related to some relabeling of flows to circumvent
the controls but the Brazilian Central Bank denies that.
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Figure 3.2: Brazil - Foreign Net Inflows (Seasonally Adjusted)
Figure 3.3: Brazil - GDP (Annualized Quarterly Change)
formally the relationship between the capital controls measures in Brazil and the real
economy.
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Figure 3.4: Brazil - Private Consumption and Fixed Investment (Annualized Quarterly Change)




Looking at Figures 3.3-3.5, it seems evident that Brazil’s imposition of capital controls
stunted growth just as it was rebounding from the 2008 crisis. In this section, we
formally analyze the connection between these measures and the real economy. To
facilitate this, we try to answer the question - what would have happened to Brazil’s real
macroeconomic aggregates had capital controls not been introduced? Brazil is a unique
economy, but not so much so that we cannot learn from other countries which are subject
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to similar shocks.
We approach the issue by comparing the economic events in Brazil to a weighted
average of countries that are comparable to Brazil. The general methodology is taken
from Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). By weighting other countries to match the
macroeconomic characteristics of Brazil, we will achieve what we term a synthetic Brazil
that did not impose capital controls. The difference in investment paths upon Brazil’s
institution of capital controls will be the real effect of capital controls.
More formally, let N be the number of countries in our sample and W = (w1, ..., wN)′
be a vector of nonnegative weights such that ∑ wj = 1, where wj represents the weight of
country j in the synthetic country. Our objective is to construct a counterfactual for the
desired variable, which would be given by Y∗1 = Y0W
∗. To do that, we will consider M
many macroeconomic factors, to which we will try to match our weighted synthetic
Brazil. These factors are pre-treatment5 average data such as the real interest rate, GDP,
foreign direct investment, and others. Let us call X0 the N ×M matrix that houses all of
the macroeconomic data for all of the countries in our sample before the imposition of
controls i.e., the vectors of pretreatment characteristics for untreated countries. Further
let us call X1 the 1×M vector of the macroeconomic variables for Brazil i.e., the vector
of pretreatment characteristics for the treated country. Finally let V be a diagonal matrix
with non-negative components whose elements reflect the relative importance of each
characteristic. Then W = {w1, ..., wN} is selected to minimize the following expression:
W∗(V) = arg min
wεW
√
(X1 − X0W)′V(X1 − X0W)
The choice of V could be subjective but we try to do it optimally following Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003). Let Y1 be the vector of time-series for the objective variable in
Brazil before the imposition of controls i.e., the vector of pretreatment time-series for the
treated country, and Y0 be the vector of the same time series for the other countries in the
5. Pre-treatment means before the imposition of capital controls in our case.
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same period. To choose V optimally, we minimize the MSE for the pre-treatment period
6:




3.3.2 Country Selection and Sample Period
For our sample, we must choose countries that have similar characteristics to the
Brazilian economy. Thus, the sample must include both Latin American countries and
other commodities producers, which arguably might be subject to the same shocks that
Brazil suffered after the Global Financial Crises. We also include the USA as the crises
was originated there but, as we will see later, its inclusion is not relevant as it gets zero
weights for all variables hereby analyzed. This leaves us with a sample of 10 countries:
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and
USA.
For the sample period, to minimize the possible effects of confounding factors and to
have the same amount of data before and after the controls, we restrict our attention to
the 15 quarter before and after the controls: 2006:1 to 2013:2.
3.3.3 The Effects on Real Investment
We begin our analysis by evaluating the effects of capital controls on real fixed
investment. First, we must decide which characteristics to include as our target
pre-treatment moments. We choose the following characteristics: GDP per capita, real
GDP growth, investment to GDP ratio, the share of capital goods imports in total
imports, current account to GDP ratio and FDI to GDP ratio. The first two characteristics
are important to get a synthetic counterpart with the same level of economic
6. Alternatively, we could choose other weighting matrices such as one that gives the same weight for
all countries.
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development, as it is well documented that poorer countries tend to invest more than
richer ones. The investment to GDP ratio controls for the level of investment before the
treatment. The share of capital goods imports controls for the reliance of the country in
foreign capital goods. It is a well known fact that developing countries rely more on
imported capital goods than developed economies and thus it is important to take this
characteristic into consideration. The current account to GDP ratio and the FDI to GDP
ratio measure the reliance on external savings to fund investments and consequently are
also important characteristics to be considered. Finally, we also consider the change in
the commodity price export index as there is some evidence that the behavior of these
economies are closely related to it.7
The countries with nonzero weights are Uruguay (58.6%), Argentina (30.6%), Peru
(5.7%) and Ecuador (5.2%). The results are shown in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.6. As we can
see, the synthetic Brazil is able to match the pre-treatment characteristics of Brazil and
the investment time series. Moreover, the level of investment in synthetic Brazil is
significantly higher at the end of the period, with a gap of around 18%.
Real Fixed Investment Brazil Synthetic Brazil
GDP per capita (PPP) 9236 11034
Real GDP growth 4.2 5.2
Investment (% of GDP) 20.6 20.6
Capital Goods Imports (% of total) 37.3 32.5
Current Account (% of GDP) -0.3 -0.3
FDI (% of GDP) 1.1 4.6
Commodity Exports Price (Average % change) 2.7 1.8
Table 3.2: Pre-Capital Controls Imposition Characteristics - 2006:1-2009:3
7. We construct real commodity export prices for each country following a methodology similar to
Deaton and Miller (1996). The methodology is composed by 5 steps: (i) we find the equivalence between
SITC level 4 groups and the IMF commodities database (composed by 51 commodities); (ii) we calculate
for each country the value of each primary commodity exports using the UN COMTRADE database, which
provides annual trade data for SITC level 4 groups, and take the average; (iii) we calculate the weights for
each commodity by dividing its average value of exports for each commodity by the average total value
of primary commodity exports; (iv) we use the weights to compute a geometric weighted-average of (US-
dollar based) monthly nominal commodity export prices; and (v) we calculate the real commodity price
index by dividing the nominal price index by the U.S. import price of manufactured articles from industri-
alized countries.
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Figure 3.6: Real Fixed Investment - Brazil vs Synthetic Brazil
To check the significance of our results, we run what is called a placebo test, applying
the methodology described before to all the untreated countries. As we can see in Figure
3.7, the effect in Brazil is significantly different than what we get for other countries,
especially after the October 2010 measures, which is coherent with the evidence in
foreign cost of capital shown in Section 3.2.
Finally, we also verify the robustness of our results by excluding from the original
sample the two countries with the biggest weights, separately. As we can see in Figure
3.8, the results are note very sensitive to the exclusion of these countries.
3.3.4 The Effects on Real Consumption
We now repeat the exercise to consumption, choosing as characteristics GDP per
capita, real GDP growth, consumption to GDP ratio, inflation, share of consumption
goods imports to total imports and investment to GDP ratio. Again, the first two
characteristics are important to get a synthetic counterpart with the same level of
economic development as poorer countries usually have a different profile of
consumption than richer countries. The former are more tilted towards goods while the
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Figure 3.7: Real Fixed Investment - Placebo Gaps
Note: The thick black line represents the gap between real and synthetic data data for Brazil while the light
gray lines represent the gap for all other countries in the sample.
Figure 3.8: Real Fixed Investment - Brazil vs Synthetic Alternatives
latter toward services. Inflation is known to be an important determinant of
consumption expenditures in the short run. The consumption to GDP ratio controls for
the level of consumption before the treatment. We also include investment to GDP ratio
to have an economy with similar spending profile. The share of consumption goods
imports controls for the reliance of the country in foreign consumption goods. Finally,
we target the change in the commodity price export index as there is some evidence that
the behavior of these economies are closely related to it.
The countries with nonzero weights are now Peru (70.4%), Uruguay (19.9%) and
Argentina (9.7%).The results can be seen in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.9. As we can see, the
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synthetic Brazil is able to match most of the pre-treatment characteristics of Brazil and
the consumption time series. Again, the level of consumption in synthetic Brazil is
higher at the end of the period, but now the gap is somewhat smaller, around 12%.
Real Private Consumption Brazil Synthetic Brazil
GDP per capita (PPP) 9236 8665
Real GDP growth 4.2 6.3
Inflation 4.6 4.6
Consumption (% of GDP) 70.2 64.2
Investment (% of GDP) 20.6 21.8
Consumption Goods Imports (% of total) 12.3 17.0
Commodity Exports Price (Average % change) 2.7 2.7
Table 3.3: Pre-Capital Controls Imposition Characteristics - 2006:1-2009:3
Figure 3.9: Real Private Consumption - Brazil vs Synthetic Brazil
We run again the placebo test, applying the methodology described before to all the
untreated countries. As we can see in Figure 3.10, again the effect in Brazil is different
than what we get for other countries, especially after 2011. However, we now have one
of the placebos closer to the Brazilian gap, which might indicate less significant results.
We exclude again from the original samples the two countries with the biggest
weights, separately, to verify the robustness of our results. As we can see in Figure 3.11,
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Figure 3.10: Real Private Consumption - Placebo Gaps
Note: The thick black line represents the gap between real and synthetic data data for Brazil while the light
gray lines represent the gap for all other countries in the sample.
the results are somewhat sensitive to the exclusion of Peru, but the level of synthetic
consumption is even higher than before, which would indicate a stronger effect of
controls on consumption.
Figure 3.11: Real Private Consumption - Brazil vs Synthetic Alternatives
3.3.5 The Effects on Real External Variables
Finally, we evaluate what the effects of capital controls were in the external real sector,
repeating the exercise for exports and imports. We choose as characteristics GDP per
capita, real GDP growth, investment to GDP ratio, consumption to GDP ratio and shares
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of consumption and intermediate goods exports or imports for each case. The first two
characteristics controls for the level of economic development for the same reasons we
had for investment and consumption. The investment and consumption to GDP ratios
are used to have an economy with similar spending profiles. The shares are important to
get a synthetic country with the same exports and imports profile. Finally, we also
control for the change in the commodity price export index as there is some evidence that
the behavior of these economies and especially its external sector is closely related to it.
The countries with nonzero weights for exports are Mexico (45.1%), Argentina
(32.1%) and Chile (22.9%) and for imports are Chile (50.6%), Peru (22.6%), Mexico
(15.6%) and Uruguay (11.3%). The results are shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 and Figure
3.12. As we can see, the synthetic Brazil is able again to match well most of the
pre-treatment characteristics of Brazil and the exports and imports time series. However,
the results now are much weaker. In fact, as we can see in Figure 3.13, running the
placebo test lead us to conclude that the effect in Brazil for the external sector is not
much different than what we get for other countries, which indicates that there weren’t
significant effects from the capital controls.
Exports Volume Brazil Synthetic Brazil
GDP per capita (PPP) 9236 12892
Real GDP growth 4.2 2.9
Investment (% of GDP) 20.6 22.9
Consumption (% of GDP) 70.2 61.9
Consumption Goods Exports (% of total) 28.5 26.1
Intermediate Goods Exports (% of total) 47.9 48.0
Commodity Exports Price (Average % change) 2.7 2.5
Table 3.4: Pre-Capital Controls Imposition Characteristics - 2006:1-2009:3
We also verify the robustness of our results again by excluding from the original
samples the countries with the biggest weights, separately. As we can see in Figures 3.14
and 3.15, the results are somewhat sensitive to the exclusion of Argentina for exports but
they are still within the range where we would conclude that there was no significant
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Imports Volume Brazil Synthetic Brazil
GDP per capita (PPP) 9236 12859
Real GDP growth 4.2 4.4
Investment (% of GDP) 20.6 21.4
Consumption (% of GDP) 70.2 61.3
Consumption Goods Imports (% of total) 12.3 16.0
Intermediate Goods Imports (% of total) 50.4 47.2
Commodity Exports Price (Average % change) 2.7 2.3
Table 3.5: Pre-Capital Controls Imposition Characteristics - 2006:1-2009:3
Figure 3.12: Real Exports and Imports - Brazil vs Synthetic Brazil
Figure 3.13: Real Exports and Imports - Placebo Gaps
Note: The thick black line represents the gap between real and synthetic data data for Brazil while the light
gray lines represent the gap for all other countries in the sample.
effect of the controls on them.
This section shows that capital controls had negative effects on both investment and
consumption in Brazil, with stronger and more significant effects in the former, and no
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Figure 3.14: Real Exports - Brazil vs Synthetic Alternatives
Figure 3.15: Real Imports - Brazil vs Synthetic Alternatives
significant effects on external real variables. These results might be important to
evaluate the welfare impacts of capital controls, which gained renewed support since the
Global Financial Crisis. We will now use microeconomic data to check whether we get
similar conclusions using firm level data and identify the types of firms that were more
affected by the imposition of controls.
3.4 MICROECONOMIC APPROACH
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
There are many potential models that we could derive here to generate estimating
equations, but that is not the objective of this work. Our objective is to provide a
quantification of the impact of capital controls, rather than a micro foundation. Our
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main estimating equation is:
Invit = β1 Invit−1 + β2After + β3After*BNDESit + β4Control Variablesit + ηi + λt + εit
Invt is investment over total assets at time t. After is an indicator variable that is one
since 2010 and 0 before. After*BNDES is one for every year after 2009 that an individual
firm received a BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) loan, and is zero everywhere else.8
We have different control variables for firms future investment opportunities (proxies for
the marginal product of capital) - the two we will show here are cash-flow over total
assets, and Tobin’s q. Our specification is similar to Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010).
All variables will be fully described, with summary statistics, in the Data section below.
We are positing a story that capital controls had the real effect of constricting
investment. We would initially expect β1 > 0, given the strong documented importance
of lagged investment on current investment spending (see for example Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1995) and Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent (2012)). Additionally, given our
story we would expect β2 < 0, that is, that investment after the imposition of controls
would be significantly lower than before. However, if the reason for the drop in
investment were a negative credit supply shock, as we assume, then we would also
expect β3 > 0 as firms who had access to subsidized credit lines were not hit as hard by
the controls as firms who did not.
Clearly the main estimating equation cannot be executed using simple OLS, as there
are many issues that would potentially distort the results to address9. We will use the
Arellano-Bond method which will deal with these issues.
8. Loans from the BNDES expanded dramatically after the Global Financial Crisis, going from an average
of R$46 billions before it to as high as R$190 billions in 2013. This strong policy action might have mitigated
the effects of capital control measures on investment and thus we find that it is crucial to control for that.
9. There is a potential for endogenous regressors, there may be fixed effects that are correlated with the
explanatory variables, and there could be autocorrelation due to the lagged variable.
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3.4.2 Data
We obtained our Micro Data from the Worldscope Database on Datastream. We
include all non-financial and non-public utility firms located in Brazil that reported data
between 1994 and 2014. We augment this data with information of firm-level yearly
loans from the BNDES10 as well as firm-level export data from the MDIC (Ministry of
Development, Industry and Foreign Trade).11
Worldscope only reports publicly available data, and so the sample has the potential
to be biased towards larger firms. We start the sample with 651 firms from 1994 to 2014.
Our first step is to drop all financial firms and public utility firms. This was done first by
dropping firms with the relevant SIC codes but then double checked manually. Then, to
minimize the possible effects of confounding factors, we restrict our attention to the four
years before and after the controls: 2006 to 2013. After that, we dropped all firms that
did not report data in both 2009 and 2010 to make sure that all firms in sample reported
the effects of the controls. We also manually went through the remaining firms to
remove any firms who had merged, or been acquired, as this produced unrepresentative
spikes in data. We ended with 265 firms.
Table 3.6 shows some summary statistics for the firms in our sample, over the total
period, as well as the four years before and after capital controls. As is evident the level
of investment dropped noticeably, as did sales, while the intensive and extensive margin
of BNDES loans jumped up significantly.
A description of the relevant variables taken from Worldscope (along with the
descriptions from the Worldscope Datatype Definitions Guide) is listed in Table 3.7. We
10. BNDES provides data for all non automatic operations, which include all loans bigger than R$10
millions and account for more than half of total BNDES disbursements. As we are focusing on publicly
trade companies, the smaller size loans should not be relevant for our analysis.
11. The MDIC only provides data that tells us whether a firm falls in one of the following 6 categories: (i)
No exports; (ii) exports up to US$ 1 million; (iii) exports between US$ 1 and US$ 10 million; (iv) exports
between US$ 10 and US$ 50 million; (v) exports between US$ 50 and US$ 100 million; and (vi) exports
more than US$ 100 million. Thus, we can only split our sample in "big exporters" and "small exporters and
non-exporting firms" without being able to control for firm size.
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Variable Total Sample Pre-Controls Post-Controls
Investment/Total Assets 0.0599 0.0709 0.0490
Tobin’s Q 18.45 35.65 1.24
Sales/Total Assets 0.754 0.799 0.707
Number of BNDES Firms 29 28 31
Total BNDES Size of Loans 18,371 13,193 23,548
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics
define investment as capital expenditure, and normalize all variables by total assets.
3.4.3 Baseline Results
The results of our baseline regressions are shown on Table 3.8. The first column is the
main regression. The second column includes business confidence at a yearly frequency,
which should help act as a similar control - the coefficient here is positive, showing that
an increase in business confidence led to higher levels of investment. The third is a novel
control that we adapt from the Macrodata exercise. SynthInv is the first difference of
synthetic Brazil’s Investment (Investment appeared to have a trend, hence the first
differencing). This variable should control for any shocks that would have affected
countries similar to Brazil, and is unique to our approach to this problem. Again here,
this control’s coefficient is positive and significant, showing that a positive shock to
investment in commodity producers (or countries similar to Brazil) increases investment
within Brazil. Controlling for that we still see coefficients with the signs we would
expect on After and After*BNDES. The coefficient on After is consistently negative and
significant at the 1% percent level. The average size of the coefficient is right around 2
percentage points. Given that the average level of investment over assets is around 6.5%,
this represents a significant decline in investment - about 30%. Additionally the
coefficient on After*BNDES is consistently positive and significant at the 1-5% level. The
size of the coefficient is around 1.2. This means that firms that had access to subsidized
credit were able to invest more than those that did not have access, even conditioning on
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Variable Definition
Assets (total) Sum of total current assets, long-term re-
ceivables, investment in unconsolidated
subsidiaries, other investments, net prop-
erty, plant, and equipment and other assets.
Adjusted for inflation.
Capital Expenditure Funds used to acquire fixed assets other
than those associated with acquisitions. In-
cludes, but not restricted to: Additions
to property, plant and equipment; Invest-
ments in machinery and equipment.
Depreciation Cost of a depreciable asset to the account-
ing periods covered during its expected
useful life to a business. It is a non-cash
charge for use and obsolescence of an asset.
Depletion Cost allocation for natural resources such
as oil and mineral deposits.
Amortization Cost allocation for intangible assets such
as patents and leasehold improvements,
trademarks, bookplates, tools and film cost.
Net Sales Net sales or revenues of the company.
Cash Sum of cash and short term investments.
Cash Flow Sum of net income and all non-cash charges
or credits. It is the cash flow of the com-
pany.
Market Value Market price-year end multiplied by com-
mon shares outstanding.
Table 3.7: Description of the Variables
the general negative trend in investment. Thus, we can infer that firms with BNDES
access were cushioned against the constraints. Since the net effect of the two coefficients
is still negative, it is reasonable to conclude that even those firms with the cushion may
have had their investment levels drop as well. The coefficient on cash flow is also
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significantly positive, though perhaps not large in magnitude. Using other control
variables, such as Tobin’s Q or sales over total assets does not change the results
significantly.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Investment Investment Investment
Invt−1 0.0760** 0.113*** 0.0773***
(0.0318) (0.0319) (0.0287)
After -0.0139*** -0.0180*** -0.0202***
(0.00356) (0.00376) (0.00410)
After*BNDES 0.0125** 0.0131** 0.0124***
(0.00506) (0.00550) (0.00473)






Constant 0.0529*** 0.00423 0.0558***
(0.00438) (0.0189) (0.00472)
Observations 1,384 1,384 1,384
Number of firms 243 243 243
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8: Results - Baseline
3.4.4 Results by Size
To break down the sample by size, we take the average value of total assets over the
period selected (2006 to 2013), and divide it into groups above the median and below the
median. Summary statistics are shown on Table 3.9.
Small Large
Average Size 357,498 10,060,000
Average Investment/Assets 0.045 0.072
Table 3.9: Summary Statistics - Breakdown by Size
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We then run the same regressions as above on the three different types of controls.
The results can be seen on Table 3.10. Interestingly, we see that the effect after capital
controls was almost twice a strong for large as for small firms. Additionally, the effect of
the BNDES loans appear to have the same rough magnitude for both groups, but is far
more significant for larger firms.12 One potential explanation for this is that the dry up
of foreign capital would have disproportionately affected larger firms, who had more
access to international capital markets. Another is that small firms generally invest a
smaller amount, in terms of a fraction of their total assets. Although we cannot speak to
the first hypothesis, we can provide supporting evidence for the second. In general,
large firms invested almost twice as much as a fraction of their total assets. Therefore the
difference in the size of the coefficients makes more qualitative sense. In general, it
appears that the fall in investment over assets from before capital controls to after was in
the vicinity of 30-40% for both groups - in line with the aggregate numbers. This
indicates, that unlike other control episodes (notably, that documented in Forbes (2007)),
there was not a significantly different effect across differently sized firms.
3.4.5 Results by Exporter
We will now break down the results by the exporting status of individual firms. The
export data was classified by overall size of exports, broken down into ranges. These
were bucketed into 6 groups (from 0 to 5) manually, and then split into two groups to be
as equally numbered as possible. Therefore, even though the column headings say
‘Small Exporters’ and ‘Large Exporters’ - these may not be strictly speaking, accurate.
Really the distinction is between firms that export a lot, and firms that export less.
Whether or not they are net exporters or that they export a considerable share of their
production is not available to us. Summary statistics are shown on Table 3.11. Exporters
12. This result might be related to the fact that BNDES disbursements were tilted towards larger firms
after the Global Financial Crisis (see De Mello and Garcia (2012), Lazzarini et al. (2014) and Bonomo, Brito,
and Martins (2015) for further evidence).
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Small Large Small Large Small Large
VARIABLES Investment Investment Investment Investment Investment Investment
Invt−1 0.295 0.158** 0.244 0.118* 0.426 -0.00257
(0.245) (0.0655) (0.188) (0.0649) (0.269) (0.0729)
After -0.008** -0.0173*** -0.0122*** -0.0223*** -0.0115** -0.0270***
(0.00416) (0.00602) (0.00428) (0.00692) (0.00516) (0.00696)
After*BNDES 0.0119 0.0176** 0.0129* 0.0183*** 0.0107 0.0142**
(0.00774) (0.00757) (0.00747) (0.00707) (0.00715) (0.00611)
Cashflow 0.000263** 0.0973 0.000245 0.0842 0.000124 0.117





Constant 0.0282*** 0.0487*** -0.0354 0.0202 0.0246* 0.0668***
(0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0308) (0.0307) (0.0130) (0.0130)
Observations 650 734 650 734 650 734
Number of firms 124 119 124 119 124 119
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.10: Results - Breakdown by Size
Small Exporters Large Exporters
Number 160 110
Average Size 2,346,970 9,396,383
Average Investment/Assets 0.0631 0.0536
Table 3.11: Summary Statistics - Breakdown by Size of Exports
that export a lot are, understandably, much larger than exporters that export less.
However, interestingly, although they are larger, they appear to invest slightly less than
smaller exporters. This is a different pattern that what emerged in the size breakdown.
We run again the baseline regressions for both groups. The results can be seen on
Table 3.12. Firms that exported more were far less impacted by the capital controls -
although investment declined, it declined by almost a full percentage point less than
their importing counterparts. These results back the intuition that the capital controls
were implemented for financial (exchange rate) reasons that would limit the harm to
exporters caused by a rapidly appreciating exchange rate.
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Small Exporters Large Exporters Small Exporters Large Exporters Small Exporters Large Exporters
VARIABLES Investment Investment Investment Investment Investment Investment
Invt−1 0.0632* 0.763*** 0.0943*** 0.726*** 0.0618* 0.824***
(0.0374) (0.161) (0.0318) (0.146) (0.0345) (0.187)
After -0.0168*** 0.00127 -0.0208*** -0.00654 -0.0229*** -0.00210
(0.00588) (0.00505) (0.00590) (0.00442) (0.00659) (0.00625)
After*BNDES 0.0214* 0.00450 0.0240* 0.00328 0.0216** -0.000706
(0.0113) (0.00585) (0.0135) (0.00554) (0.0109) (0.00595)
Cashflow 0.000514*** 0.0153 0.000328 0.0186 0.000402** -0.0356





Constant 0.0566*** 0.00731** 0.0222 -0.0787** 0.0593*** 0.00608
(0.00617) (0.00943) (0.0293) (0.0318) (0.00693) (0.0121)
Observations 775 609 775 609 775 609
Number of firms 160 112 160 112 160 112
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.12: Results - Breakdown by Size of Exports
Thus we have shown, both in aggregate and broken down by size and export status,
that investment over total assets dropped after the imposition of capital controls. Pretty
consistently, the magnitude of the drop was about 30 to 40% of its original value. Large
exporters, and firms that had access to the BNDES for loans did not suffer as large of a
drop off.
3.5 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have shown that investment in Brazil unambiguously declined after
the imposition of capital controls in late 2009. Unconditionally, we showed with micro
data investment over total assets dropped at the firm level between 30 and 40 percent.
Firms of different sizes were not generally differentially affected, but larger exporters
fared better than smaller exporters. Additionally, firms that had access to subsidized
credit from Brazil’s Development Bank (BNDES) also performed much better than those
that did not. Conditionally, we showed with macro data that Brazil’s total investment
was close to 20 percent lower in 2013 than it would have been had controls not been put in
place. Moreover, although larger exporters seem to have suffered less from the controls,
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we do not find any significant effect on real exports after their imposition.
The support for macroprudential policies in general and particularly for prudential
capital controls has increased substantially after the Global Financial Crisis. In theory,
capital controls can be desirable and welfare improving if they help to avoid financial
and macroeconomic instability. However, if they have a disproportionate effect on
investment as our results indicate, they might also have strong and long-lasting effects
on potential growth, especially in economies with low savings rate such as Brazil. These
effects should be taken into account to evaluate the welfare impacts of such measures.
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A.1 DATA
The dataset includes quarterly data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and
South Africa for Emerging Economies and Australia, Canada, New Zealand and
Norway for Advanced Economies. The sample periods vary across countries.They are:
Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway 1994Q1-2013Q4, Brazil
1994Q2-2013Q4, South Africa 1995Q1-2013Q4, Colombia and Peru 1997Q1-2013Q4 and
Chile 1999Q2-2011Q3.
Real Output and Real Investment: all the data are from national sources, deflated by
each own deflator and seasonally adjusted using ARIMA X-12.
Trade Balance to GDP ratio: all the data are from national sources, dividing nominal
trade balance by nominal GDP.
Real Credit: obtained by dividing nominal credit to non-financial sector by the CPI
and seasonally adjusted using ARIMA X-12. For Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Norway and South Africa, nominal credit to non-financial sector is obtained from the
BIS in http://www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit.htm. For Chile, Colombia,
Peru and New Zealand, nominal credit to non-financial sector is obtained from each
country’s Central Bank. CPI is obtained from national statistical agencies.
Real Interest Rate: for emerging economies, the country specific interest rate in the
international financial markets, R, is measured as the sum of J. P. Morgan’s EMBI+
sovereign spread and the U.S. real interest rate. The U.S. real interest rate is measured by
the interest rate on the three-month U.S. Treasury bill minus a measure of the U.S.
expected inflation. EMBI+ is a composite index of different U.S. dollar-denominated
bonds on four markets: Brady bonds, Eurobonds, U.S. dollar local markets and loans.
The spreads are computed as an arithmetic, market-capitalization-weighted average of
bond spreads over the U.S. Treasury bonds of comparable duration. For advanced
economies, the country interest rate is measured by the interest rate on the three-month
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bill (Central Bank policy rate when this is not available) minus expected inflation
(12-month accumulated inflation when this is not available).
Real Exchange Rates: obtained from the BIS effective exchange rate indices database,
particularly the quarterly average of the broad indices. Nominal EERs are calculated as
geometric weighted averages of bilateral exchange rates. Real EERs are the same
weighted averages of bilateral exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices. The
weighting pattern is time-varying, and the most recent weights are based on trade in the
2008-10 period (see broad and narrow weights in
http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer.htm). An increase in the index indicates
an appreciation.
Real Commodity Export Price: calculated following Deaton and Miller (1996) and
Chen and Rogoff (2003) through 5 steps: (i) I find the equivalence between SITC level 4
groups and the IMF commodities database (composed by 51 commodities); (ii) I
calculate for each country the value of each primary commodity exports using the UN
COMTRADE database, which provides annual trade data for SITC level 4 groups, and
take the average; (iii) I calculate the weights for each commodity by dividing its average
value of exports for each commodity by the average total value of primary commodity
exports; (iv) I use the weights to compute a geometric weighted-average of (US-dollar
based) monthly nominal commodity export prices; and (v) I calculate the real
commodity price index by dividing the nominal price index by the U.S. import price of
manufactured articles from industrialized countries.
Figure A.1 shows the average time series of all detrended variables for each group of
countries and the IMF real commodity price.
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Figure A.1: Business Cycles and Commodity Prices.
Note: The data are the simple average of the indicators for the Emerging (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Peru and South Africa) and Advanced (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway) main commod-


















































t )− bβU′t+1A1(cTt+1, cNt+1)
(A.6)
• Euler equation for household debt
λt = βR∗t Etλt+1 (A.7)
• Capital accumulation and investment demand
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(A.20)
• Tradables market clearing
yTt = c
T
t + it + tb
T
t (A.21)





t − cmT,t) (A.22)
• Trade balance
tbt = tbTt + tb
CM
t (A.23)
• Country interest rate
r∗t = r̄∗ + ψ
D(ed
∗
t−d̄∗ − 1) + ψCM(epCMt − p̄CM − 1) + εr∗t (A.24)







cat = tbt − r∗t d∗t (A.26)
• Net foreign assets evolution
cat = d∗t+1 − d∗t (A.27)
• Banking sector balance sheet






















+ νB pNt dt−1 (A.30)
• Leverage constraint
pNt dt = φ
Bnt (A.31)




• Market clearing labor
ht = hCM,t + hT,t + hN,t (A.33)
• Total investment
it = iCM,t + iT,t + iN,t (A.34)
• Total output








log(pCMt+1)− log( p̄CM) = ρPCM1 log(pCMt − log( p̄CM))+ ρPCM2 log(pCMt−1− log( p̄CM))+ εPCMt
(A.36)
log(aCM,t+1) = ρCMlog(aCM,t) + εCMt (A.37)
log(aT,t+1) = ρTlog(aT,t) + εTt (A.38)
log(aN,t+1) = ρN log(aN,t) + εNt (A.39)
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A.3 STEADY STATE CALCULATION
First, normalize r∗ to the calibrated value. Using the foreign sector equation and
household euler equation we can get
d∗ = d̄∗ (A.40)
ca = 0 (A.41)





From the net worth evolution equation we then get
R =
1− θBR∗ − νBφB
φBθB
+ R∗ (A.44)



































= qN(R∗ − 1 + δ) (A.50)
Using the output equation and the definition of the shadow rental rate of capital we














From the labor demand by firms in the commodity sector we then get
wCM =
(1− αCM)pCMaCM(





Using the definition of the shadow rental rate of capital and the demand for











Using the previous equation and the definition of the shadow rental rate of capital we














From the labor demand by firms in the final tradable goods sector sector
wT =
(1− αT − γT)θTaT(















































































































































Combining the definition of the shadow rental rate of capital and the demand for





1 + ηT Rt−1Rt
)
 kT (A.66)
tbCM = pCM(yCM − cmT) (A.67)
From the trade balance equation
tbT = tb− tbCM (A.68)
From the capital accumulation equations we get
iCM = δkCM (A.69)
iT = δkT (A.70)
iN = δkN (A.71)



























Nontradable market clearing yields
cN = yN (A.76)




















d = dCM + dT + dN (A.80)





n = pNd− d∗B (A.82)
Using the equation for total foreign borrowing
d∗H = d∗ − d∗B (A.83)
Aggregate hours, investment and GDP are given by
h = hCM + hT + hN (A.84)
i = iCM + iT + iN (A.85)
y = tbCM + yT + pNyN (A.86)
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Using the definition of the consumption basket
c = [χ(cT)1−1/µ + (1− χ)(cN)1−1/µ]
1
1−1/µ (A.87)






























λt = (1− bβ)U′A1(cT, cN) (A.91)
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B.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF RESERVE ACCUMULATION
International reserves are defined as all liquid assets in foreign currency that are in
the balance sheet of the government. Under the Bretton Woods system (1944-73), the US
dollar functioned as the world’s reserve currency, so dollar denominated risk free assets
became the main component of international reserves along with gold. After its end,
many countries adopted flexible exchange rate regimes, in which case in theory
international reserves should not be necessary. However, the tendency of liberalization
in the capital account lead to a focus in the role of reserves to mitigate the effects of
highly volatile financial flows.
Figure B.1 shows the evolution of international reserves to GDP ratio for developed
and emerging economies since 1970. Beginning in the end of the 80s, we can see a strong
divergence between the path of reserves for these 2 groups. While advanced economics
started to reduce reserve holdings, emerging economies more than doubled theirs as a
percent of GDP, with the pace of accumulation increasing a lot after the Russian and
Asian crisis of the late 90s. This phenomenon seems to be related to the
underdevelopment of domestic financial systems in emerging markets and the desire of
these countries to self-insure against a sharp deterioration in external financing
conditions after the strong impacts of the crisis of the late 90s.
In an attempt to evaluate how much international reserves a sovereign should hold in
an environment of highly volatile capital flows, Pablo Guidotti, Argentinean deputy
finance minister, and Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, created at the
end of the nineties the so-called Guidotti-Greenspan rule. This rule stated that the
optimal level of reserves should be full coverage of foreign liabilities coming due within
a year and became the most widely used rule of thumb for determining the adequate
level of international reserves even today. After that, several authors offered different
explanations for the strong buildup of international reserves by emerging markets but,
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Figure B.1: International Reserves (% of GDP)
Note: The data are the simple average sampled annually from 1970:2011. All variables are expressed in
percentage points of GDP.
Source: Authors’ computations based on World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database.
as noted by De Gregorio (2011), "an explanation and robust conclusions on the optimal
level of reserves are still lacking.". This paper contributes to fill this gap with a still
unexplored explanation, the role of reserves as collateral for external borrowing in
periods of financial turmoil.
136
